MARION L. ODOM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marion Odom appeals sentences imposed after his guilty pleas to breaking and entering charges, arguing he was promised a maximum five-year concurrent sentence under a plea bargain but received two concurrent fifteen-year terms instead. The court reversed and vacated the judgments and sentences, holding that when a trial court fails to honor a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas.
When a defendant enters guilty pleas based on a negotiated plea agreement and the trial court subsequently fails to honor that agreement, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court vacated the sentences and remanded for the defendant to exercise this right.
[1] A defendant who enters a guilty plea based on a negotiated agreement is entitled to withdraw the plea if the agreement is not honored by the court.
[2] When a trial court advises a defendant that a plea agreement will be honored, and then fails to adhere to its terms, the defendant should be given the opportunity to with…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“punishment would be concurrent time, and five years. . . .”
The trial court's statement to Odom regarding the negotiated terms of the plea agreement before accepting his guilty pleas
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOdom initially pleaded not guilty to charges of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony. He reached a negotiated plea ag…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant, Marion L. Odom, seeks reversal of judgments and sentences imposed upon him pursuant to his negotiated pleas to charges of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony. Initially, appellant pled not guilty to the offenses. At the time appellant withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered his guilty pleas, his counsel informed the court of an agreement with the state by which appellant would change his pleas to guilty for a maximum term of five years imprisonment, sentences to run concurrently. The trial court apparently concurred in the agreement and so advised appellant prior to acceptance of his guilty pleas that “ . . . punishment would be concurrent time, and five years. . . . ”
On June 3, 1974, appellant appeared before the court for sentencing, at which time he received two concurrent fifteen-year terms. On this timely appeal, appellant argues that his cause should be remanded to the trial court for sentencing in accordance with the negotiated terms of his plea bargain.
We agree that the judgments and sentences cannot stand. It is clear from the record that appellant entered his guilty pleas with the understanding that he would receive a maximum of five years. When this agreement was not honored, either through mistake, inadvertence, or subsequent change in the trial court’s concurrence with the plea bargain, appellant should have had the opportunity to withdraw his pleas. See RCrP 3.171(c) which states:
. After an agreement on a plea has been reached, the trial judge may, with the consent of the parties, have made known to him the agreement and reasons therefor prior to the acceptance of the plea. The terms of the agreement shall be placed in the record. He shall thereafter advise the parties of whether other factors (unknown at the time) may make his concurrence impossible. Should such other factors make ultimate judicial concurrence impossible, any plea of guilty or nolo contendere entered based upon such agreement may thereafter be withdrawn.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that specific performance of a plea bargain is not available to a defendant in the absence of a clear showing of irrevocable prejudice to the prosecution or the defense. See Davis v. State, Fla.1975, 308 So. 2d 27; Brown v. State, Fla.1971, 245 So. 2d 41; Barker v. State, Fla.App.2d 1972, 259 So. 2d 200..
Accordingly, the judgments and sentences are hereby set aside and vacated to give appellant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. See Kiefer v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 295 So. 2d 688.
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (67 total)
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Brooks v. State, 349 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…ealed from is affirmed, but this case is remanded for resentencing of appellant. The present sentence does not specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed as required by Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Smith v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Moreover the phrase “at hard labor” in the sentence is improper. McDonald v. State, 321 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th [*795] DC A 1975). The appellant does not have to be present at resentencing. HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY and SCH…
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Nova v. State, 439 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ly enforced, and, as here, the defendant is not irrevocably prejudiced by relying on the agreement, the defendant’s remedy for its violation cannot be to compel its performance. See Pringle v, State, 341 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). However, Nova’s inappropriate choice of relief cannot be a basis for affirming the trial court’s denial of his motion. As Rule 3.850 itself notes, it is only when “the motion a…
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McCLAIN v. State, 356 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…sentence are affirmed, but the case is remanded for resen-tencing of appellant. The present sentence does not specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed as required by Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1975). Smith v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Moreover, the phrase “at hard labor” in the sentence is improper because no existing state statute provides for imprisonment at hard labor as a sentence for any offense. Speller v. State, 305 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Appell…
Previewing 3 of 67 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1971)
- Vikki Zimmerman Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975)
- Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Kiefer v. State, 295 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)