ARTHUR E. MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
DOROTHY M. MOORE, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part a final judgment awarding alimony, child support, and other relief to the wife. The court required clarification of whether alimony was permanent or rehabilitative, deleted an unauthorized partition order, and remanded for specification of the nature of mortgage payment obligations.
The court affirmed the awards of life insurance and medical/dental insurance for the children but required the trial court to clarify whether alimony was permanent or rehabilitative and to specify the classification of mortgage payments. The court reversed and deleted the partition order for the home, finding the court lacked authority to order partition without a prayer for partition from either party.
[1] A trial court must clarify whether alimony awarded is rehabilitative or permanent.
[2] A trial court lacks authority to order partition of a marital home absent a prayer for partition by either party.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge probably intended the alimony to be permanent; however, we return this portion of the decree to the trial court with directions to clarify whether the alimony is permanent or rehabilitative”
Establishes that the appellate court required clarification of alimony type despite inferring the trial judge's intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArthur E. Moore and Dorothy M. Moore were parties to a dissolution of marriage. The trial court awarded alimony and child support to the wife, awarded…
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NATHAN, Judge.
Arthur E. Moore appeals that portion of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding alimony, child support and use of the home to the wife, Dorothy M. Moore; requiring the husband to maintain life insurance on his own life and medical and dental insurance for the children, make mortgage payments on the home and ordering the sale of the home in the future with equal division of the proceeds between husband and wife.
First, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to specify whether the alimony awarded was rehabilitative or permanent. The record reveals that the trial judge probably intended the alimony to be permanent; however, we return this portion of the decree to the trial court with directions to clarify whether the alimony is permanent or rehabilitative. See Melin v. Melin, Fla.App.1972, 265 So. 2d 414, 416.
Second, we find that it was error for the court to order that the home be sold and the • proceeds be split upon the happening of the stated contingencies, because there was no prayer for partition by either of the parties. For this reason, the court was without authority to provide for partition of the home and division of the proceeds. Goodstein v. Goodstein, Fla.App.1968, 212 So. 2d 321. This portion of the final judgment hereby is ordered deleted. The decision of whether and when to partition the subject property must be left to the tenants in common. Valentine v. Valentine, Fla.1950, 45 So. 2d 885.
Third, the judgment is silent as to whether the husband’s obligation to pay the mortgage payments was alimony, child support or otherwise, therefore we return this portion to the trial court with directions to specify the classification of the said payments. The nature of the payments will not only have definite tax consequences, but will also be a factor to be taken into consideration when, and if the property is partitioned in the future. See Rogoff v. Rogoff, Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 456.
Fourth, the court was authorized to order the husband to maintain a $75,000 life insurance policy for the benefit of the minor children. Under these circumstances, the insurance on the husband’s life provides security for the payment of maintenance and support awarded his minor children. Harloff v. Harloff, Fla.App. 1973, 279 So. 2d 91; Bosem v. Bosem, Fla. 1973, 279 So. 2d 863.
Fifth, it was proper for the court to order the husband to maintain medical and dental insurance on the children in addition to paying all of their medical and dental expenses. It can be considered as security for payment of those expenses. It is well within the discretion of the trial court to order an ex-husband to pay for his children’s medical and dental expenses. Schultz v. Schultz, Fla.App.1974, 290 So. 2d 146. See also Rabinovich v. Rabinovich, Fla.App.1973, 276 So. 2d 206.
Sixth, the court expressly confined its reservation of jurisdiction to the subject matter of the original final judgment. There is a Florida case in which the decree reserving jurisdiction “to resolve issues between the adult parties litigant” was found to be excessively broad,1 but this does not obtain in the case sub judice. In any future proceedings for modification, the trial judge must act in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the Dissolution of Marriage Act2 as interpreted by the courts of this State. Therefore, the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction was proper. The final judgment herein appealed is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the trial court with directions.
. Durden v. Durden, Fla.App.1962, 137 So. 2d 29.
. See, e. g. §§ 61.13(1) and 61.14, Fla.Stat.
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Frechter v. Frechter, 548 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…med, we find that the order should be sent back to the trial court for a statement as to whether it is being awarded for the purpose of child support or alimony. See Zediker v. Zediker, 398 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), citing Moore v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA) (judgment dissolving marriage should specify whether husband’s obligation to pay mortgage payments is alimony, child support or otherwise), cert. denied, 324 So. 2d 87 (Fla.1975). Further, the final judgment as it affects Mrs. Frechte…
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Shufflebarger v. Harry L. Shufflebarger, M.D., 460 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…al parent to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his minor child. Hinebaugh v. Hinebaugh, 403 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for rev. dismissed, 408 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981); Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Moore v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Even though a parent’s duty of support ordinarily ceases when a child reaches majority, an exception exists where an adult child suffers from physical or mental deficiencies. Perla v. Perla, supra; Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482 (F…
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Eberly v. Eberly, 344 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…fore us: Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1st DCA 1961); Harloff v. Harloff, 279 So. 2d 91 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1973); Becker v. King, supra; Perkins v. Perkins, 310 So. 2d 438 (Fla.4th DCA 1975); Moore v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 152 (Fla.3d DCA 1975), cert. den., 324 So. 2d 87 (Fla.1975). The earlier cases sustained such orders as proper to provide security for child support payments otherwise ordered, even though those orders appeared to make the children absolute beneficiarie…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bosem v. Arie Lionel Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1973)
- Valentine v. Valentine, 45 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1950)
- Rogoff v. Rogoff, 115 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Bettie B. Schultz v. Schultz, 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Peggie Melin v. Melin, 265 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Durden v. Durden, 137 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Goodstein v. Goodstein, 212 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Harloff v. Harloff, 279 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Rabinovich v. Rabinovich, 276 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)