ERNIE LEE BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bell appealed his conviction for rape and petty larceny, arguing that the trial court erred by telling a juror that all six jurors must agree on a verdict immediately after giving an Allen charge during jury deliberations. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the unqualified statement coerced the jury and may have prevented a hung jury.
The trial court's unqualified statement that all six jurors must agree was erroneous because jurors do not have to agree to reach a verdict, and the statement coupled with the Allen charge may have coerced an unconvinced juror to agree with the majority, thereby depriving the defendant of a hung jury and violating the constitutional right to an impartial jury verdict.
[1] A trial court's unqualified response to a juror's question about unanimity, immediately following an Allen charge, can coerce the jury and deprive a defendant of a fair t…
[2] A juror's question about whether all jurors must agree on a verdict, when answered by the court, must be handled with care to avoid coercing minority jurors.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Nothing must be said or done by the trial court to embarrass or coerce an unconvinced juror or jurors to agree with the verdict or the majority simply because he or she is in the minority”
Establishes the legal principle that trial courts cannot pressure minority jurors to conform to majority views
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter approximately two hours of jury deliberation, the foreman reported the jury could not agree on the evidence. The trial court gave an Allen charg…
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RAWLS, Chief Judge.
The sole point asserted by appellant in this appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crimes of rape and petty larceny is: “The Court erred in that after giving the so-called Allen charge, following two hours of deliberation by the jury, when a lady member of the jury immediately asked, ‘Do all six have to agree?’, in answering, ‘Yes, Ma’am’ with no further explanation or qualification.”
While the jury was involved in their deliberations, at 9:07 p. m. the following transpired:
“THE COURT: Mr. Foreman, have you reached your verdict?
“FOREMAN CARTER; Sir, I’m sorry, but I don’t exactly know how to answer the question. The jury cannot agree on the evidence that has been put forth.
“THE COURT: Can I help you in any way ? I can’t give you any more evidence than what you have.
“FOREMAN CARTER: I’m sorry, but I was picked to represent them and there is—
“THE COURT: Let me give you one other charge, maybe, and when I give you this charge, it might help you a little bit and we will maybe give you another try at it.
“Ladies and gentlemen, it is your duty to agree on a verdict if you can do so without violating conscientiously held convictions that are based on the evidence or lack of evidence. No juror from mere pride of opinion hastily formed or expressed should refuse to agree. Yet, no juror simply for the purpose of terminating the case should acquiesce in a conclusion that is contrary to his own conscientiously held view of the evidence. You should listen to each other’s views, talk over your differences of opinion in a spirit of fairness and candor and if possible dissolve your differences and come to a common conclusion so that a verdict may be reached and this case may be disposed of.
“You may retire to your jury room for further deliberations.
“A JUROR: Can I ask a question ? “THE COURT: Yes, ma’am.
“A JUROR: Do all six have to agree? “THE COURT: Yes, ma’am.
“MR. RIPLEY: Well, the lady propounded the question do we all six have to agree and that’s not so. If they want to, they can come back in five minutes and still say they cannot agree.
“THE COURT: I don’t think the question was put in that vein, I think the question was do they have to agree on it to reach a verdict is what she was asking.”
Within sixteen minutes thereafter the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
In State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1974), our Supreme Court observed that the use of the “Allen” charge has been implicitly approved in this state in the adoption of Standard Jury Instruction 2.19. So, the giving of the foregoing “Allen” charge in appropriate situations is not reversible error. However, in the instant case it is apparent that at least one juror had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant. Immediately after the trial court gave the “Allen” charge, the following colloquy transpired:
“A JUROR: Can I ask a question ?
“THE COURT: Yes, ma’am. “A JUROR: Do all six have to agree?
“THE COURT: Yes, ma’am.”
The unqualified reply by the court was erroneous in that all jurors DO NOT have to agree. Nothing must be said or done by the trial court to embarrass or coerce an unconvinced juror or jurors to agree with the verdict or the majority simply because he or she is in the minority, Jones v. State, 92 So. 2d 261 (Fla.1957). The statement by the court that all six had to agree, coupled directly with the “Allen” charge, may well have deprived this appellant of a “hung jury”. An impediment to the exercise by a juror of a free and independent judgment is inconsistent with the mandate of Article I, Section 16, Constitution of the State of Florida, that the verdict of the jury must be impartial.
The judgment appealed is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
^Reversed.
JOHNSON and MILLS, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (15 total)
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Gahley v. State, 567 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 904, 83 L.Ed.2d 919 (1985). A trial court should say nothing to a jury that would influence a single juror to abandon his conscientious belief as to the correctness of his position. Bell v. State, 311 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Rodriquez v. State, 462 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla.3d DCA), review denied, 471 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1985); Lewis v. State, 369 So. 2d at 669; United States v. Blevinal, 607 F. 2d at 1126. Absent fundamental error, an objection is require…
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Kozakoff v. State, 323 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…t not be calculated to coerce a jury into reaching a verdict or to lead them to believe that they must reach a verdict. State v. Bryan, supra; Jones v. State, 92 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957); Lee v. State, 239 So. 2d 136 (1st DCA Fla.1970); Bell v. State, 311 So. 2d 179 (1st DCA Fla.1975). In other words, a defendant has the right to have a hung jury, Lee v. State, supra; Bell v. State, supra, and “nothing should be said by the trial court to the jury that would or could likely influence the decision of a single ju…
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Scoggins v. State, 691 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…required to reach a unanimous verdict or that the jurors had a duty to do so. Kelley, 486 So. 2d at 584-85; State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1974); Webb, 519 So. 2d at 749; Nelson, 438 So. 2d at 1062; Rodriguez, 462 So. 2d at 1178; Bell v. State, 311 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). There was no threat of marathon deliberations. See Gahley, 567 So. 2d at 459. The judge did not ask whether the jurors in the majority were for acquittal or a guilty verdict; nor did he single out the minority jurors in implorin…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974)
- Jones v. State, 92 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956)