IN THE INTEREST OF M. D. B., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 14-year-old juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based on a confession following a breaking and entering charge. The appellate court reversed, holding that the confession was involuntary because the arresting officer promised not to charge the juvenile with other offenses in exchange for the confession, which constitutes an improper inducement.
The confession must be suppressed because it was obtained through an improper promise. The police officer's promise that the juvenile would not be charged with other offenses constitutes a direct implied promise that renders the confession involuntary. Miranda warnings do not cure the defect of a confession obtained through such inducements.
[1] A confession is inadmissible if obtained by a direct or implied promise, however slight.
[2] A confession obtained by promises of leniency regarding other offenses is involuntary and must be suppressed.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“not be extracted by any sort of threat or violence, nor be obtained by any direct or implied promise, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence.”
Establishes the legal standard that confessions must not be obtained through any implied promise, however minimal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.D.B., a 14-year-old, was arrested and confessed to breaking and entering. During interrogation, the arresting officer promised that if the juvenile …
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WALDEN, Judge.
Defendant was adjudicated a delinquent on charges of breaking and entering, and was committed to the State Division of Youth Services. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his confession, and the juvenile appeals that denial. We agree with his contentions and reverse on the basis of testimony given at the suppression hearing by the arresting officer and the juvenile.
We do not consider defendant’s contention that the officer promised him he could go home if he confessed, as the officer denies such a promise; however it is undisputed that the officer promised that the juvenile would not be charged with other offenses if he confessed:
“I told [M] like I told him many times in the past; that if he helped me, I would help him; that if he knew what I was talking about, he wouldn’t be charged with X amount of cases. The same little game that [M] and I have played in the past.”
The juvenile verified this:
“Q Did Officer Hurt discuss any other case with you?
“A Yes.
“Q Did he make any promises or tell you it would benefit you in any way concerning these other cases ?
“A Yes.
“Q What did you say exactly if you recall?
“A Exactly, I don’t know, but he told me there probably wouldn’t be charges brought — ‘all I want to do is clear up the paper work’.”
It is basic that a confession, to be admissible, must
“not be extracted by any sort of threat or violence, nor be obtained by any direct or implied promise, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence.” 13 Fla.Jur. Evidence § 248 (1957) (Emphasis added.)
A confessing defendant should be free from the influence of either hope or fear, and the confession should be excluded if the attending circumstances were calculated to delude the defendant or exert undue influence over him. Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1958); Harrison v. State, 152 Fla. 86, 12 So. 2d 307 (Fla.1943); State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1974); Paulk v. State, 211 So. 2d 591 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1968); Kraft v. State, 143 So. 2d 863 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1962), and Hooper v. State, 115 So. 2d 769 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1959). In Lawton v. State, 152 Fla. 821, 13 So. 2d 211 (Fla.1943) a confession was held involuntary when the defendant confessed based on the understanding he would not be prosecuted.
There is no question but that the officer here made like promises to the 14 year old defendant in return for the confession. Although defendant’s age does not automatically render the confession invalid, we have noted that minority is a factor to be considered in determining'voluntariness, see 87 A.L.R.2d 624 (1963).
The fact this defendant received his Miranda warnings, see Hallihan v. State, 226 So. 2d 412 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1969), does not vitiate the error committed when promises were made for a confession. Since confessions (unlike pleas) can not be bargained for, the instant confession must be suppressed.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
OWEN, C. J., and KAPNER, LEWIS, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1958)
- Jackson Holloway Hooper v. State, 115 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Cellos Harrison v. State, 152 Fla. 86 (Fla. 1942)
- Lawton v. State, 152 Fla. 821 (Fla. 1943)
- Paulk v. State, 211 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Kraft v. State, 143 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Hallihan v. State, 226 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)