ERNEST E. DROTOS, APPELLANT,
v.
WAHNEEDA W. DROTOS, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenged a post-judgment order denying his petition to reduce child support and terminate alimony payments and finding him in contempt for non-payment. The court affirmed, holding that the child support obligation continued until age 21 regardless of the child reaching age 18, and that the husband's intentional delinquency justified the contempt finding.
The court held that child support obligations continue until age 21 or until the child marries, becomes self-supporting, or reaches 21, whichever occurs first, and that reaching age 18 alone does not terminate the obligation. The contempt finding was proper where the husband was shown to have intentionally defaulted on payments. The alimony award was not rehabilitative in nature and could not be terminated absent a showing of changed circumstances.
[1] A court may not reduce child support based on a child reaching the age of 18 if the original support order stipulated support until the child reaches 21 years of age.
[2] A statute changing the age of majority operates prospectively and does not affect existing rights and obligations unless expressly stated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court correctly refused to regard as a ground for reducing the child support the fact that one of the children had become 18 years of age, where support had been ordered until the child became 21 years of age, which had not yet been attained.”
Establishes that age 18 alone does not terminate child support obligations when the judgment requires support until age 21.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband and wife divorced in 1971 under a judgment requiring the husband to pay $175/month alimony to the wife (continuing until remarriage) and $…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an interlocutry appeal, by the respondent in an action for dissolution of marriage, from a post judgment order denying his petition for reduction of child support and to terminate alimony payments to the wife, and finding him in contempt of court for partial default in the ordered payments. On consideration thereof we find no reversible error, and affirm.
In the judgment of dissolution of marriage, entered in 1971, the court granted alimony permanent in nature, the provision therefor being “The husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $175 per month as alimony, said payment to continue until such time as the wife remarries”. For support of the two children of the marriage the judgment ordered payment by the husband of $250 per month “until such time as one of the children becomes married, reaches the age of 21 years or becomes self-supporting, whichever occurs first, at which time such child support shall be reduced in the amount of $75 per month and the husband shall pay for the remaining minor monthly child support in the amount of $175 and continue until such child becomes married, self-supporting or attains the age of 21 years”.
On February 7, 1974 the husband filed his petition for modification. Therein he alleged that the older child, Elaine, had become 18 years of age, and alleged the wife was employed and capable of self support.
The court correctly refused to regard as a ground for reducing the child support the fact that one of the children had become 18 years of age, where support had been ordered until the child became 21 years of age, which had not yet been attained. By express provision of the 18 year old majority statute, Ch. 73-21, § 3, it was provided that the act should operate prospectively, and “shall not affect the rights and obligations existing prior to the effective date of this act” [July 1, 1973]. See Finn v. Finn, Fla.App.1974, 294 So. 2d 57; Finn v. Finn, Fla. 1975, 312 So. 2d 726; Daugherty v. Daugherty, Fla.App. 1974, 293 So. 2d 394; Daugherty v. Daugherty, Fla. 1975, 308 So. 2d 24. The said older child had not married. She was attending college, and, although she had a part-time job, was not shown to be self-supporting. It follows that no excuse in law was shown for the failure of the husband to pay tht child support ordered in the judgment, and where it was shown that the husband was delinquent therein intentionally, the holding that he was in contempt of court was not error. The alimony allowance was not, as contended by the husband, rehabilitative in nature, and there was no showing of changes in the circumstances of the parties for which the alimony should be terminated.
The judgment is affirmed.
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Aumaitre v. Troyanos, 344 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…entions in the light of the record, briefs and arguments of counsel and have concluded that no reversible error has been made to appear. See Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1975); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1975); Drotos v. Drotos, 311 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Dalton v. Dalton, 304 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Field v. Field, 291 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Register v. Register, 230 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975)
- Daugherty v. Georgette Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1975)
- Finn v. Finn, 294 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Georgette Daugherty v. Daugherty, 293 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)