JACK TAYLOR, D/B/A THE OCEAN PAVILION, APPELLANT,
v.
JEANETTE H. ROSMAN, PERSONALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF HERMAN ROSMAN, DECEASED, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1975-05-06
No. 74-966
Before BARKDULL, C. J., HENDRY, J., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
312 So. 2d 239 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1975) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A landlord sued to recover rent and damages under a two-year lease renewal agreement. The tenant moved to dismiss, arguing the lease was unenforceable under Florida law because it lacked the required two witnesses to the landlord's signature. The appellate court reversed, holding the renewal was merely an extension of the prior lease and the tenant was estopped from asserting the statutory defect.


Holding

The court held that the renewal agreement constituted merely an extension of the first lease rather than a new lease, and therefore was not subject to the strict statutory witness requirement. Additionally, the court held that the tenant was estopped from defeating the renewal agreement by asserting the statutory defect, having occupied the apartment and paid rent under the similar first agreement for nearly two years.


Headnotes

[1] A lease agreement for a term exceeding one year, which is not subscribed by two witnesses as required by statute, may be deemed an unenforceable "new lease" if challenged…

[2] A lease agreement that is a renewal or extension of a prior, similar lease, rather than a "new lease," may not be subject to the statutory witness requirement for enforce…

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Key Quotes

“the second agreement was not a "new lease" as contended by the appellee, but merely constituted an extension by renewal of the first lease”

Establishes the court's central holding that the renewal constitutes a continuation rather than a new agreement subject to strict statutory formalities.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Taylor leased an apartment to appellee Rosman and her husband under an initial rental agreement. The parties renewed the lease on September …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant filed this lawsuit against the appellee seeking to recover rent payments due under the terms of a rental agreement as well as damages done to the appellee’s apartment under an almost identical prior rental agreement and attorney’s fees.

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appellant’s complaint on the grounds that the second lease agreement, being in excess of one year (two years), was unenforceable under Fla.Stat. § 689.01, F.S.A. because on the face of the agreement only one subscribing witness to the signature of the landlord appears instead of the required number of two witnesses.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, and this appeal ensued. We reverse.

The renewal of the two-year lease agreement was signed on September 28, 1973 to commence on February 1, 1974 and extending to January 31, 1976. At that time, appellee and her husband, who has since died, had been living in their apartment leased from the appellant for over a year and a half under the prior rental agreement.

The two rental agreements are substantially the same form contracts, and both agreements were even executed in a similar manner (including one witness to the signature of the landlord and tenant).

It is our conclusion, therefore, that the second agreement was not a “new lease” as contended by the appellee, hut merely constituted an extension by renewal of the first lease. Cf., Kornblum v. Henry E. Mangels Company, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 16; Leibowitz v. Christo, Fla.1954, 75 So. 2d 692. Further, we hold that the appellee is estopped to defeat the second lease agreement by asserting Section 689.01 because she and her deceased husband occupied the apartment for almost two years under the similar first rental agreement, making rental payments thereunder. Arvanetes v. Gilbert, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So. 2d 825; Lipkin v. Bonita Garden Apartments, Inc., Fla.App. 1960, 122 So. 2d 623.

Therefore, for the reasons stated, the final order of dismissal appealed is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • S & I Invs. v. Payless Flea Mkt., Inc., 36 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …lease was a valid extension by renewal of the 1995 lease, with substantially the same terms4 and executed in the same manner as the earlier lease. Therefore, two subscribing witnesses were not required. [*915] Both parties rely on Taylor v. Rosman, 312 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), as the key case on the issue. In Taylor, the tenant moved to dismiss a complaint seeking rent payments under the second lease between the parties. Id. at 240. The tenant argued the lease was unenforceable under section 689.0…
  • Frankel v. Bernstein, 334 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …ontract, which it was held was not personal to the deceased grower and was equally performable by his representatives. The holding of the trial court in this case was not in conflict with the holding of this court in Taylor v. Rosman, Fla.App.1975, 312 So. 2d 239. The questions involved here and theory upon which this case was decided in the trial court were not involved or discussed in Taylor v. Rosman, supra. Applicable to this case is the proposition that where a contract is one which, according to its p…
  • Wash-Bowl Vending Co., Inc. v. NO. 3 Condo. Ass'n, 485 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …and may be canceled by unit owners other than the developer under the following circum-stances_(emphasis supplied). . Gill v. Livingston, 158 Fla. 577, 29 So. 2d 631 (1947); Bodden v. Carbonell, 354 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Taylor v. Rosman, 312 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Arvanetes v. Gilbert, 143 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). . "The manifest object of requiring an attestation of subscribing witnesses is to enable the grantee to prove the execution by the grantor of the deed, and to show the cir…

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