MILTON PEOPLES, JR., BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, MILTON PEOPLES, SR., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, INC., A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, AND PAUL M. FRY, APPELLEES
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In this automobile negligence action, plaintiffs sued the defendant driver and his insurer in 1970, but the original suit was dismissed due to the insurer's receivership and lack of prosecution. When plaintiffs refiled against the Insurance Guaranty Association four years later, the trial court dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations had run against both the original defendant and the guaranty association.
The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statute of limitations barred the action both against the original defendant Fry and against the Guaranty Association, since the Guaranty Association stands in the same shoes as the original insurer and cannot be held liable without establishing the insured's legal obligation to pay damages.
[1] An action against a liability insurer is barred by the statute of limitations if the underlying action against the insured is time-barred.
[2] A tort victim cannot maintain a third-party beneficiary action against a liability carrier without first establishing a legal obligation on the part of the insured to pay…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To begin with, we know of no legal impediment existing at the time of the aforesaid receivership to continuing the original action against Fry. As to him, therefore, it is rudimentary we think that this action comes too late.”
Establishes that the statute of limitations had run against the original defendant since the plaintiffs could have continued their original suit during the receivership.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn automobile accident occurred on November 8, 1968, involving defendant Paul Fry. Plaintiffs sued Fry and his insurer, First American Insurance Compa…
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McNULTY, Chief Judge.
In this automobile negligence action appellants first sued appellee Fry and his carrier, First American Insurance Company, in 1970 on account of an accident which occurred on November 8, 1968. During that action First American went into receivership in Dade County and the Dade County Circuit Court enjoined further proceedings in any pending suits as against First American. Thereafter, the aforesaid pending action was entirely dismissed for lack of prosecution.
Subsequently, appellee Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. was appointed successor to First American in the receivership proceeding pursuant to Ch. 631, F. S., and this suit was begun on the 22d day of December, 1972, four years and 44 days after the date of the accident. The trial court dismissed this action pursuant to the statute of limitations and this appeal ensued. We affirm.
To begin with, we know of no legal impediment existing at the time of the aforesaid receivership to continuing the original action against Fry. As to him, therefore, it is rudimentary we think that this action comes too late.
As to Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc., it stands precisely in the same shoes as First American; and the latter would have had to respond under its liability coverage only upon the establishment of a legal obligation on the part of its insured (Fry in this case) to pay damages. On this point, it is now well settled that the insured is an indispensable party to a so-called “third-party beneficiary’! action (such as this) brought by a tort victim against a liability carrier under the latter’s liability coverage.1 This being so, and the establishment of Fry’s legal obligation to pay in the premises being legally barred as aforesaid, it follows that no action may now be maintained against Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. No error being otherwise made clearly to appear, therefore, the judgment should be and it is hereby affirmed.
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. . See Kephart v. Pickens, Fla.App.4th, 1972, 271 So. 2d 163, cert. denied, Fla.1973, 276 So. 2d 168. See also Catron v. F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., Fla.App.2d, 1974, 292 So. 2d 74; insurance Company of North America v. Braddon, Fla.App.3d, 1973, 285 So. 2d 634, cert. denied, Fla.1974, 300 So. 2d 266.
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Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…extent of its obligations on the covered claims, and, to such extent, shall have all rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent” (emphasis added). See Peoples v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 313 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 34 (Fla.1976). Consequently, at bar, a crucial issue in this case is the scope of coverage oí the insurance policy issued to the defendant by First Miami. In the instant case, the appellant FIGA, in…
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Troso v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc., 538 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…t file the amended complaint in this case until after the statute had already run. Since appellants are legally barred from pursuing the insured, no action may now be maintained against FIGA. Peoples v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc., 313 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 34 (Fla.1976). AFFIRMED. ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. . In Warner-Lambert, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint without leave of court two days prior to the running of the statute of limit…
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Carrousel Concessions, Inc. v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n & Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 483 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…m arises. . The supreme court quashed in part and approved in part the decision of the fourth district court of appeal, 425 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). . FIGA "stands in the shoes” of the insolvent insurer. Peoples v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 313 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert0. denied, 327 So. 2d 34 (Fla.1976); § 631.57(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985) (the association shall “[b]e deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims, and, to such extent, shall have all rights, dut…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Augusta Kephart v. Pickens, 271 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Augusta Kephart and Edward Lester Kephart v. Pickens, 276 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1973)
- Resolute Ins. Co. v. State, 300 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1974)
- Ins. Co. OF N. Am. & Andrew Seidell v. Braddon, 285 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Allen v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Daffin Mercantile Co. & Cont'l Nat'l Am. Grp. v. Relmon Stephens, Jr., 300 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1974)
- Catron v. F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., 292 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)