MINNIE LEE BROWN, JULIA MASSEY AND BEATRICE MCMULLAN,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Three women were convicted of second-degree murder under an indictment charging first-degree murder. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, addressing whether the trial court properly admitted rebuttal evidence consisting of a witness's complete prior testimony at a coroner's inquest after the defendants introduced fragmentary portions to impeach him.
The trial court did not err. When a witness is impeached through fragmentary portions of a sworn statement from a former hearing, the opposing party may introduce the complete statement insofar as it is connected with, explanatory of, and clarifies the fragmentary portion previously introduced, provided the entire statement concerns the same subject matter and is not merely corroborative.
“When a witness is sought to be impeached by the introduction of a fragmentary portion of a sworn statement made by him at a former hearing, the other party may then introduce the whole statement, so far as it is connected with, or explanatory of, the part previously introduced, and tends to give a clearer picture of what the witness actually said on the prior occasion than does the fragmentary portion.”
Establishes the foundational rule that complete prior statements may be introduced on rebuttal when fragmentary portions are used for impeachment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArchie Blunt was the sole eye-witness to the homicide and testified that the defendants committed the crime acting in concert. During cross-examinatio…
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The appellants were convicted of murder in the second degree under an indictment charging them with murder in the first degree. They appeal from the judgment.
The only eye-witness to the homicide was one Archie Blunt, whose testimony was to the effect that the crime was committed by the defendants acting in concert. Having testified in chief, Blunt was cross-examined concerning certain testimony given by him at the coroner’s inquest prior to the trial. This cross-examination consisted of reading to the witness fragmentary portions of the testimony that he was supposed to have given at the inquest, and asking him the usual questions as to whether or not he had given such testimony. The witness admitted giving some of the answers attributed to him. Others, he admitted having given in sub.stance, but not in the exact form transcribed. Still others he flatly denied having given at all.
For the purpose of impeaching the witness, the defendants, in their case in chief, introduced a transcript not only *700of the precise questions and answers as to which the witness had been interrogated on cross-examination, but certain other portions of his testimony given before the coroner’s jury, in connection therewith.
On rebuttal, the state attorney was allowed to place before the jury all of the testimony given by the witness at the coroner’s inquest. The refusal of the trial judge to exclude this rebuttal evidence is assigned as error.
There was no error in the lower court’s ruling. When a witness is sought to be impeached by -the introduction of a fragmentary portion of a sworn statement made by him at a former hearing, the other party may then introduce the whole statement, so far as it is connected with, or explanatory of, the part previously introduced, and tends to give a clearer picture of what the witness actually said on the prior occasion than does the fragmentary portion. Powers, et al., v. United States, 5 Cir., 294 F. 512; Blackerby v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 832, 255 S.W. 824; Whart Cr. Ev., 11th Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 1402, p. 2295; Greenleaf on Evidence, 16th Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 462b, p. 596; Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Secs. 1045, 2113; 70 C. J. Sec. 1333, p. 1145.
Of course, this is not to say that the whole testimony is admissible if it is not relevant or material to the precise matter on which the witness has been interrogated, or if its only purpose is to corroborate, or bolster, the testimony presently given by a witness, by reading into evidence a statement made by him at a former hearing. But where, as in this case, the whole statement deals directly with but the one subject matter as to which the witness was sought to be impeached, and is connected therewith and explanatory thereof, it is permissible to admit it in its entirety to show the true meaning of the .fragmentary portions as to which was interrogated, and to give the jury the benefit of the entire substance of what was said by him at the former hearing.
All other grounds of appeal have been considered and are found to be without merit.
The case was tried by a judge who appears from the record to have been scrupulously fair to the defendants. It was sub*701mitted to the jury under full and proper instructions. There was sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of murder in the second degree, if the jury saw fit to believe the testimony of the eye-witness, Archie Blunt.
No error being made to appear, the judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
BUFORD, C. J., BROWN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Am. Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…statement was necessary as counsel is entitled to read relevant portions of the statement to explain the apparent inconsistency in the witness’ testimony at trial. Hernandez v. State, 156 Fla. 356, 22 So. 2d 781 (1945); Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 698, 13 So. 2d 3 (1943). See also King v. Califano, 183 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). The testimony of the witness Bates, called by AMC, related to a crucially important aspect of AMC’s defense: that the fire was caused by spillage of diesel fuel rather than by g…
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Hernandez v. State, 156 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1945)…’ “Answer: ‘Yes, sir.’ “And then the following question, ‘What did he tell you he was going to do ?’ “Answer: ‘He didn’t say what he was going to do.’” This proffer was not accepted, and the trial proceeded. In the case of Brown et al. v. State, 152 Fla. 698, 13 So. (2nd) 3, the only eye witness to the homicide there involved, having testified in chief, was cross examined concerning certain testimony given by him at the coroner’s inquest, by reading to the witness fragmentary portions of the testimony t…
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Eugenio Coto Bega v. State, 100 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)…rly brings this case within the definition of murder in the second degree. See Jones v. State, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 522; Melton v. State, Fla.1949, 41 So. 2d 450; Storey v. State, 1943, 153 Fla. 185, 13 So. 2d 912; Brown v. State, 1943, 152 Fla. 698, 13 So. 2d 3; and Taylor v. State, 1939, 139 Fla. 542, 190 So. 691, 124 A.L.R. 835. As to point number two, the state offered into evidence the knife, to which appellant objected because the evidence did not in any manner link the appellant with the knife. Appe…
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