JOE BRYANT, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS A. STEVENS, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1975-05-23
No. 74-1291
McNULTY, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
313 So. 2d 124 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Bryant appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging an oral partnership with Stevens for buying and selling real estate, where Stevens held title to properties on Bryant's behalf. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that Bryant should have been allowed to amend his complaint to remove allegations suggesting the arrangement was to circumvent creditors or avoid licensing requirements.


Holding

The court held that Bryant should have been permitted to file his amended complaint. The amended complaint stated a valid cause of action on its face, and Bryant was not estopped to maintain an inconsistent position in his pleadings unless his previous position had been successfully maintained at trial.


Headnotes

[1] A party is not estopped to maintain an inconsistent position in pleadings unless the previous position has been successfully maintained.

[2] A court should permit a party to file an amended complaint if it states a cause of action on its face.

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Key Quotes

“A party is not estopped to maintain an inconsistent position in his pleadings unless the previous position has been successfully maintained.”

Establishes the legal principle allowing Bryant to amend his complaint and remove inconsistent allegations about the partnership's purpose without being bound to the original allegations.

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Facts & Procedural History

Bryant and Stevens allegedly entered into an oral partnership to buy and sell real estate. The original agreement provided that Stevens would take tit…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Judge.

GRIMES, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from an order denying his motion to file an amended complaint and dismissing the cause with prejudice.

In his original unsworn complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant had entered into a partnership “for the purpose of carrying on the business of buying and selling real estate and other related businesses.” He alleged that by the terms of the oral partnership agreement all properties would be taken in the name of the defendant because there were outstanding judgments against the plaintiff. Pursuant to the agreement, he asserted that certain properties had been bought and sold at a profit and that he had not received his share of these profits. He further alleged that the defendant had refused to acknowledge his interest in other partnership property still held in the defendant’s name. Plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the defendant from disposing of the remaining assets of the partnership and to require the defendant to render an accounting.

Following a hearing, the court entered an order stating:

“1. That the alleged partnership agreement was established, according to the Plaintiff’s Complaint, for the purpose of allowing the Plaintiff to operate as a real estate salesman without obtaining a real estate license and for the further purpose of defrauding Plaintiff’s creditors.

“2. That such purposes are either illegal or contrary to public policy, or both.

“3. That if the allegations of said Complaint are proven they would not warrant a court of equity in finding that a legal partnership existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant; . ”

The complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed a motion to file an amended complaint. The proffered amended complaint read essentially the same as the original complaint except that it alleged that the parties had agreed that all properties would be taken in the name of the defendant “for purposes of convenience.” The plaintiff also filed an affidavit in which he swore that he had not acted as the realtor in any transaction for the partnership and that he did not have title in the properties taken in the defendant’s name to defraud creditors but only for purposes of convenience. In the order denying the motion to amend, the judge observed that the amended complaint simply omitted certain facts set forth in the original complaint and that the plaintiff could not escape from the facts which he had previously pled.

While the pleading and procedure followed by the plaintiff left something to be desired, we believe that he should have been permitted to file his amended complaint. On its face, it clearly stated a cause of action. There was nothing in either complaint to' suggest that the parties were dealing with anyone’s real estate other than their own. The plaintiff was not bound to his original allegations about his creditors. A party is not es-topped to maintain an inconsistent position in his pleadings unless the previous position has been successfully maintained. Olin’s, Inc. v. Avis Rental Car System of Florida, Fla.1958, 104 So. 2d 508.

At this stage in the litigation, it is not necessary for us to pass upon the question of whether the equitable rule which bars the recovery of assets conveyed to others in fraud of creditors1 is applicable to a situation where a party with existing creditors goes into partnership and causes subsequently acquired assets to be placed solely in the name of his partner.2

The order of dismissal is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

McNULTY, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . Spector v. Ahrenholz, Fla.App.3rd, 1958, 107 So. 2d 34.

. See Vercesi v. Petri, Pa.1939, 334 Pa. 385, 5 A. 2d 563.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Calvin deMARLOR v. Foley Carter Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
    …oceeding. He did not prevail on those defenses (actually, the case never got to trial), therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel could not arise. Grauer v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 363 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Bryant v. Stevens, 313 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). We also reject appellees’ contention that the directed verdicts were proper because appellant sustained no monetary damage from the negligence and/or treachery of his brokers. His losses in the first cause of action are easily c…
  • Jantzen v. Cotner, 513 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …that assumed by her in her cross-petition for modification.”). While the wife’s petition was withdrawn and did not result in an actual order to that effect, so that it cannot be technically said that an estoppel arose against her, Bryant v. Stevens, 313 So. 2d 124, 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) ("A party is not estopped to maintain an inconsistent position in his pleadings unless the previous position has been successfully maintained_”); Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. d…
  • Whitelock v. Geiger, 368 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …oth parties are in pari delicto, the court will leave them to settle their disputes without the aid of the court. Cf. Spector v. Ahrenholz, 107 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Schetter v. Schetter, 279 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Bryant v. Stevens, 313 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Affirmed. . The business had been appraised at $4,700,000.…

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