JAMES LEE THACKER A/K/A JOHN JOHNSON THACKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Lee Thacker appealed his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, claiming he did not know the gun was in his car. The court reversed and remanded, holding that a guilty plea should not be accepted when a defendant denies knowledge of an essential element of the crime, even if that knowledge could be inferred from circumstantial facts.
A guilty plea should not be accepted when a defendant denies facts essential to the commission of a crime, even if those facts could be inferred from other evidence in the record. Here, the court should not have accepted Thacker's plea without first ensuring he understood that knowledge of the gun's presence in his car was an essential element of the offense.
[1] A guilty plea should not be accepted where the defendant denies facts essential to the commission of the crime, even if those facts appear elsewhere in the record.
[2] A court may accept a guilty plea when a defendant equivocates as to their state of mind if the facts before the court clearly give rise to an inference of the requisite k…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a guilty plea should not be accepted where the defendant denies facts which are essential to the commission of the crime even though these facts may appear elsewhere in the record”
Establishes the controlling legal principle from Kendrick v. State that essential elements cannot be waived by guilty plea if defendant denies them
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Thacker pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During the court's inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea, Thacker …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was represented by counsel and the court conducted an inquiry to determine that his plea was voluntarily and in telligently made. However, the following colloquy also occurred:
“THE COURT: . . . Now, tell the Court, did you actually do what you are charged with having done ? Did you actually have a firearm when you are a convicted felon?
THE DEFENDANT: Judge, your Honor, the firearm was in my car unknowing to me. The last time I seen it my wife had it. I’m guilty of possession of it because it’s my car.”
At sentencing appellant reiterated the claim that he didn’t know the gun was in his car. In Kendrick v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1975, 308 So. 2d 152, this court held that a guilty plea should not be accepted where the defendant denies facts which are essential to the commission of the crime even though these facts may appear elsewhere in the record. There may be instances, however, in which a defendant admits engaging in conduct which if accompanied by the requisite knowledge or intent would constitute the offense, but equivocates as to his state of mind at the time the conduct occurred. In such a situation, if the facts before the court clearly give rise to an inference that the requisite knowledge or intent existed, the court may accept a plea of guilty after having satisfied itself that the plea was made voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. See Professor Moore’s analysis of the similar Federal Rule requiring a factual basis for the plea at 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 11.03(4) (2d ed. 1975); Bruce v. United States, 1967, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 379 F. 2d 113.
At first blush, the case sub judice seems to fall in this latter category because knowledge of the gun’s presence could be inferred since it was in the appellant’s automobile. Spataro v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1965, 179 So. 2d 873. Yet, the record re-fleets that the appellant seemed to think he could "possess” the gun even though he didn’t know it was in his car. Hence, the guilty plea should not have been accepted without first insuring that appellant understood that knowledge of the presence of the gun in the car was an essential element of the crime with which he was charged. The judgment and sentence is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded so as to give the appellant the opportunity to change his plea to not guilty.
McNULTY, C. J., and HOBSON and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Davis v. State, 605 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…336 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1976); State v. Lyles, 316 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1975); Williams v. State, 534 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Eisaman v. State, 440 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Monroe v. State, 318 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Thacker v. State, 313 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 35 (Fla.1976). In Kendrick, the court noted: Where a defendant raises the possibility of a defense to his guilty plea, the potential prejudice is apparent. In such circumstances, a trial judge should ma…
Authorities Cited
- Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
- Bunyan L. Kendrick v. State, 308 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)