HENRY M. FARRIOR, AS SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, FLORIDA,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. FOSTER COMPTON
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Foster Compton, a hotel operator holding a valid occupational license, was convicted under a statute that explicitly exempted licensed hotel operators. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to overturn the conviction, holding that Compton's hotel satisfied the statutory requirements for licensing and thus fell within the exception to the criminal statute.
The judgment of conviction was reversed and affirmed. The court held that persons operating a hotel and paying an occupational license under Section 205.29 are specifically excepted from the provisions of Section 205.37, and Compton satisfied the statutory requirements by operating a hotel with beds for ten or more persons.
“Persons operating a hotel and paying an occupational license under Section 205.29, are specifically excepted from the provisions of Section 205.37, supra.”
Establishes the statutory exception that shields licensed hotel operators from criminal liability under the challenged statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFoster Compton held an occupational license from Washington County's Tax Collector to operate the 'Green Lantern Hotel' for 1942-43. The hotel consist…
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The record in this case discloses that Foster Compton paid and held an occupational license issued by the Tax Collector of Washington County, Florida, under Section 205.29, Fla. Stats. 1941, authorizing the operation for 1942-43 of a hotel known as the “Green Lantern Hotel,” consisting of nine bedrooms. Double beds were in each of seven rooms, while two double beds were in each of the other two. It is admitted that the “Green Lantern Hotel” had accommodated on designated nights, and possessed the capacity on each night, to sleep “ten or more persons.” Compton was convicted in the County Judge’s Court of Washington County for the violation of Section 205.37, Fla. Stats. 1941. Persons • operating a hotel and paying an occupational license under Section 205.29, are specifically excepted from the provisions of Section 205.37, supra. The evidence shows that Compton is within the exception supra.
Section 205.29, supra, classifies certain enumerated businesses designated as boarding houses, lodging houses, tourist camps, cabin camps, auto courts or hotels, “having beds for ten or more, persons,” for taxation purposes. The tax assessed against each of the businesses, so operated, shall be fifty cents per room. We are unable to read into the Act that one person only shall sleep in a single bed located in a separate room, as here contended, but more than one guest may be accommodated by sleeping together in a double bed and more than one double bed can or may be placed in a single room, but for taxation purposes the Legislature intended that each hotel, tourist camp, cabin and lodging house must have and possess sufficient beds as a minimum to accomodate “ten or more persons” during the night. The Green Lantern Hotel operated by Compton, it is admitted, accommodated and had beds for “ten or more persons.”
Counsel for appellant contends that the sufficiency of the *756evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction entered in the County Judge’s Court of Washington County cannot be raised by habeas corpus, as was done in the case at bar, but the proper and only method of review is by an appeal from the judgment of conviction so entered to the circuit court in conformity with the statutes applicable thereto. It has not been shown by the record that the petitioner ever violated the statute cited and the lower court so held. The answer to this contention is the cases of Watson v. Stone, 148 Fla. 516, 4 So. (2nd) 700; McCreary v. State ex rel. Garrison, 124 Fla. 330, 168 So. 422; McLeod v. Chase, 95 Fla. 736a, 116 So. 858-9.
The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
BUFORD, C. J., TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
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State of Fla. ex rel. B. "Babe" Shargaa v. Culver, 113 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1959)…proposition that habeas corpus has many times been held to be available to a person convicted and restrained under a state of facts which, as a matter of law, could constitute no offense against the laws of Florida. Farrier v. State ex rel. Compton, 152 Fla. 754, 13 So. 2d 147; Watson v. Stone, 148 Fla. 516, 4 So. 2d 700. Having duly considered the matter on the petition and return and the writ having heretofore been issued, it is ordered that the petitioner Shargaa be and he is hereby released from the cu…
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Wallace Corp. v. Earnest Overstreet, 99 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)…els from this statute, otherwise affecting “any place where dancing is permitted”, etc., was recognized as being an appropriate and effective exemption, in Mouchas v. Stoutamire, 148 Fla. 373, 4 So. 2d 459, 460, and Farrior v. State ex rel. Compton, 152 Fla. 754, 13 So. 2d 147. The Pellicer case and State ex rel. Hughes v. Wentworth, 135 Fla. 565, 185 So. 357, 360, in outlining the purpose of the statute, held it was enacted as an exercise of the police power as well as the taxing power of the legislature,…
Authorities Cited
- Watson v. Stone, 4 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1941)
- Brazier v. State, 95 Fla. 896 (Fla. 1928)
- McCreary v. State, 124 Fla. 330 (Fla. 1936)