DORIS R. AKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TAYLOR ET AL., APPELLEES; BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TAYLOR, JR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. DORIS R. AKINS, APPELLEE
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Two consolidated appeals from an accident case involving a tractor-trailer. The court reversed a directed verdict that had been entered against the passenger-plaintiff due to her failure to identify the driver and lessee, holding that denying her motion to reopen was an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed judgment in the parallel case against the vehicle's owner where affirmative defenses became moot upon reversal of the companion case.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because the information was already admitted in interrogatory answers and its exclusion based on a technicality would prevent the jury from determining the justice of the case. The directed verdict was error as there was sufficient evidence of negligence to submit to the jury.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion to reopen a case to admit evidence that was inadvertently omitted, especially when the evidence is crucial to esta…
[2] A directed verdict is improper when there is sufficient evidence of negligence to present the case to a jury.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Law suits are no longer a cat and mouse game to such an extent that a party will be denied an opportunity to have a jury determine the justice of his cause on such a minor technicality.”
Establishes the court's rationale for allowing reopening of the case despite the procedural oversight in failing to introduce interrogatory answers
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Doris R. Akins was a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident with a tractor-trailer. The tractor-trailer was operated by Benjamin Fra…
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[*14] PER CURIAM.
The appeals in the above cases have been consolidated by previous order of this court. Case No. U-37 is an appeal from final judgment entered upon a directed verdict in favor of appellees, Benjamin Franklin Taylor and Refrigerated Transport Company, defendants below, made at the conclusion of appellees’ case in chief. The suit arose from an accident between a vehicle in which appellant was a passenger and a tractor-trailer vehicle. Appellant contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny appellant’s motion to reopen its case to allow appellant to put in evidence appellees’ answers to interrogatories which would identify the driver of the tractor-trailer involved in the accident and his occupation and would show that the tractor-trailer was being operated at the time under lease to appel-lee Refrigerated Transport Company. We agree. The identification of the driver and the lease were admitted by appellees in their answers to interrogatories and it was purely an oversight that appellant failed to' put them in evidence. Law suits are no longer a cat and mouse game to such an extent that a party will be denied an opportunity to have a jury determine the justice of his cause on such a minor technicality.
In addition to the lack of identity of the driver and the lessee of the vehicle, the motion for directed verdict was grounded upon the alleged failure of appellant to prove a prima facie case of negligence against appellees. We have examined the record and find sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the driver of the tractor-trailer that it was error for the trial court to take the case away from the jury although we realize the basis for the directed verdict may have only been appellant’s failure to identify the driver of the tractor-trailer and the lessee of same. We, therefore, reverse Case No. U-37 and remand it for further proceedings consistent herewith.
The consolidated case, W-309, is an appeal from final judgment in favor of Doris R. Akins, appellee in this case and plaintiff below. This suit was brought against Benjamin Franklin Taylor, Jr., who was identified as the owner of the tractor-trailer unit, and his insurer. The driver of the vehicle was Benjamin Franklin Taylor, Sr. Appellants contend the court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict as to the affirmative defenses of estoppel by judgment and res judicata. This motion was predicated upon the final judgment in companion case No. U-37. Inasmuch as we are here reversing the final judgment in Case No. U-37, this point is moot.
We have considered the briefs and the record as to appellants’ additional contentions and find them to be without merit.
Case No. W-309 is affirmed and Case No. U-37 is reversed and remanded.
RAWLS, C. J., and BOYER and Mc-CORD, JL, concur.
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Exxon Co. v. Alexis, 370 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1978)…s case will not be reversed unless the opposing party was prejudiced thereby. Considerable latitude and discretion is afforded the trial judge in these matters. See Eli Witt Cigar & Tobacco Co. v. Matatics, 55 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1951); Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); King v. State, 272 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Similar discretion reposes with the Judge of Industrial Claims. In the case before us, we are not persuaded that the Industrial Relations Commission erred in failing to find that…
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Lotspeich Co. v. Neogard Corp., 416 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…defendant. The trial court denied a motion to re-open the case for the purpose of introducing the original release document, which on these facts, would be an abuse of discretion. Bieiey v. Bieley, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The proffered release shows that the injured plaintiff gave complete satisfaction to appellee as well as appellant as joint tort-feasors, giving appellant the right to contribution. Woods and G.E.I. C.O. v. Withrow, 413 So. 2d 1…
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Silber v. Cn'R Indus. OF Jacksonville, Inc., 526 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…hrifty Super Market, Inc. v. Kitchener, 227 So. 2d 500 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); 55 Fla.Jur.2d, Trial §§ 47-48 (1984). Indeed, it may even amount to an abuse of discretion not to permit a party to reopen its case in some circumstances. See Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). But the trial court’s discretion is not unlimited, for it may allow reopening only “where this can be done without injustice to the other party.” Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); and see cases c…
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