MARY KATHLEEN CRUMPTON, APPELLANT,
v.
BOBBY RAY CRUMPTON, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1975-06-23
No. X-262
Rawls, C. J., Boyer, J., McCord, J.
314 So. 2d 233 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Trial court properly terminated child support obligations when the child reached age 18, as the divorce judgment contained no provision requiring support to continue beyond that age.


Holding

Child support obligations terminate at age 18 absent a specific provision in the divorce judgment requiring continuation to a later age.


Headnotes

[1] Child support obligations terminate when a child reaches age 18 absent an express provision in the divorce judgment requiring support to continue to a specified later age…

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Facts & Procedural History

A divorce judgment dated January 19, 1971 required the father to pay child support "until the further order of this court" with no specification of ag…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals an order of the trial court finding that the appellee was not obligated to continue paying support payments for a child who had reached her eighteenth birthday. The final judgment of divorce dated January 19, 1971, which of course predated the order here appealed, simply provided that the defendant (appel-lee here) “pay to the plaintiff * * * child support * * * until the further order of this court.” That is, there was no provision that the child support payments continue until the subject child attain any particular age, specifically 21 years. There is no indication in the record that said final judgment was based upon any agreement or stipulation of the parties. Appellant, while conceding that the facts in the case sub judice are very similar to those in White v. White, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 296 So. 2d 619, nevertheless urges that the White case has been reversed by applica tion of Daugherty v. Daugherty, Sup.Ct. Fla.1975, 308 So. 2d 24, Case No. 45,587, opinion filed January 22, 1975. We do not so find. Daugherty is clearly distinguishable from White and does not explicitly nor by implication overrule nor reverse same. Accordingly, on authority of White v. White, supra, the order here appealed is

Affirmed.

RAWLS, C. J., and BOYER, J., concur. McCORD, J., concurs specially.

Concurrence
McCORD, Judge

McCORD, Judge

(concurring specially).

While I dissented from the majority opinion in White v. White, supra, the ruling in that case is the ruling of this court unless subsequently changed by a higher court. I, therefore, concur in the foregoing opinion. I agree that because of the factual situation in Daugherty v. Daugherty, supra, the Supreme Court did not there overrule the law of White.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
    …retion, the District Court substituted its opinion for that of the trial judge as to which parent would best satisfy the welfare of the child. * * * ” (322 So. 2d at page 24; emphasis added) . Supra. See also Crumpton v. Crumpton, Fla.App.1st 1975, 314 So. 2d 233. . Rule 3.6l, FAR provides in material part: “Unless the record shows to the contrary, it shall he presumed, upon appellate proceedings, that the record transmitted to the Court contains all proceedings in the lower court material to the points pre…
  • Crumpton v. Crumpton, 333 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
    …McCORD, Judge. Certiorari was taken to the Supreme Court from this court’s opinion in this cause — Crumpton v. Crumpton, Fla.App. (1st), 314 So. 2d 233 (1975). The Supreme Court on March 25, 1976, issued its mandate on its order of February 12, 1976, in which it stated: “. . . this cause is remanded to the District Court of Appeal, First District for reconsideration in the light of our decision in…

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