BAYVIEW HOMES COMPANY, A CORPORATION, AND FREDERICK VAN ROY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
FRANK D. SANDERS, AS RECEIVER OF CITRUS COUNTY BOND FUND SECURITIES, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1931-07-21
Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur., Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Davis, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
102 Fla. 516 Florida Supreme Court (1931) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 136 So. 234
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Bayview Homes Company and Frederick Van Roy challenged a judgment against them on a $700 note held by a court-appointed Receiver of Citrus County Bond Fund Securities. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the Receiver had valid authority to sue despite the defendant's jurisdictional challenge to the legal existence of the fund he represented.


Holding

The court held that the Receiver had valid authority to sue. The court's order appointing the Receiver and authorizing him to institute suit was valid and could not be collaterally attacked through a plea challenging the legal existence of the entity he represented. The validity of such an order could only be reviewed on direct appeal, not through collateral attack.


Key Quotes

“It is a well settled rule that the court may take judicial notice of its rulings, judgments and decrees.”

Establishes the court's authority to take judicial notice of its own orders appointing the Receiver

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Facts & Procedural History

Bayview Homes Company and Van Roy executed a note for $700 dated January 25, 1929, payable to the Bank of Crystal River. The note was assigned to the …

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Opinion of the Court
Buford, C.J.

Buford, C.J.

— In this ease defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error on a note payable to the Bank of Crystal River in the sum of $700.00 dated January 25, 1929, and due thirty days after date.

It was alleged in the declaration that the note was assigned and transferred to the Trustees for county bonds in and for Citrus County, Florida, and held by the bond trustees to secure moneys on deposit to their credit in the Bank of Crystal River; that on June 10th, 1929, the Bank of Crystal River was declared insolvent and placed in the hands of the Comptroller and that W. B. Moon was appointed as Receiver for the Bank of Crystal River. It was further alleged that on January 27th, 1930, in a cer*517tain case then pending the plaintiff Sanders was appointed Receiver in that cause in which W. V. Knott, State Treasurer, and others were complainants and G. I. Singelton and others wore defendants; that Sanders qualified as such Receiver; that he was designated Receiver of Citrus County Bonds Fund Securities and that by order of court he was duly authorized to collect the note sued on with other notes and was authorized and directed to file all suits that might be necessary for that purpose and that it became necessary for him to file this suit and that the note sued on had been duly transferred and assigned by W. B. Moon as Receiver of the Bank of Crystal River and by the Trustees of County Bonds and that the plaintiff “is now owner and holder of the note.”

There was a demurrer to the declaration. The demurrer was overruled. The defendant then filed a plea which was in the words and figures as follows, to-wit:

“That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction in this cause nor right to hear, try and determine this action, because defendants say that the Citrus County Bond Funds Securities for which the plaintiff purports to act as Receiver, is not and was not at the time of the commencement of this action, a person or corporation, and that said Citrus County Bond Funds Securities had no legal existence whatsoever, being neither a person nor a corporation. Wherefore, defendants say that the said Citrus County Bond Funds Securities has not the right to maintain this action, and that therefore, the plaintiff herein, who purports to act as Receiver for it, has no other or further rights than said Citrus County Bond Funds Securities .which has no legal existence as hereinabove set forth. ’ ’

Demurrer to the plea was sustained. There was a motion to strike which was also allowed. The defendant having announced that he did not desire to plead further, it was ordered that upon presentation of evidence before the Court, final judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff. Upon proof being submitted, final judg*518meat was entered against the defendant in favor of the plaintiff.

Writ of error was taken.

It is a well settled rule that the court may take judicial notice of its rulings, judgments and decrees. It was proper for the circuit court to take judicial cognizance of its order appointing Sanders Receiver.

The power to appoint a Receiver is one inherent in a court of equity. Armour Fertilizer Works vs. First National Bank of Brooksville, 87 Fla. 436, 100 Sou. 362.

The plea utterly failed to show that the order appointing the Receiver was void. It also failed to show that the order authorizing the Receiver to institute and maintain the suit was void. Unless such order was void, its validity could only be reviewed on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally as is here apparently attempted.

No reversible error being made to appear, the judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Davis, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Edenfield v. Crisp, 186 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
    …ncellor as to warrant or require this Court to reverse and set it aside. The power to appoint a receiver is always one that is inherent in a Court of equity, Armour Fertilizer Works v. First Natl. Bank, supra, and Bayview Homes Co. v. Sanders, 1931, 102 Fla. 516, 136 So. 234, and such appointment in a proper case is well settled, Beard v. Viser, 1923, 86 Fla. 265, 97 So. 718. A receiver after all is the agent of the Court, and his possession of receivership funds is the Court’s possession, notwithstanding t…
  • Farley v. Farley, 790 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
    …he appointment of the Ohio receiver in this state, was denied. An order of a court appointing a receiver is reviewable on appeal as a non-final order where the issue is the right to immediate possession of property. See Bayview Homes Co. v. Sanders, 102 Fla. 516, 136 So. 234 (1931). [*575] Applying principles of comity, Florida courts generally recognize a foreign receiver’s standing to bring an action in this state. See S. Colonization Co. v. Parten, 83 Fla. 300, 91 So. 263 (1922); Metro. Inv. Corp. v. Buc…
  • Ins. Mgmt., Inc. v. McLEOD, 194 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
    …r withheld according to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Dixie Music Co. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671, 185 So. 441 (1938); Welch v. Gray Moss Bondholders Corpo [*18] ration, 128 Fla. 722, 175 So. 529 (1937); Bayview Homes Co. v. Sanders, 102 Fla. 516, 136 So. 234 (1931) ; Armour Fertilizer Works v. First Nat. Bank of Brooksville, 87 Fla. 436, 100 So. 362 (1924). Generally, a temporary receiver is appointed only to preserve the property and to protect the rights of all parties therein. M. H. McC…

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