RICHARD ARLISS LEMON, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICIA JANE LEMON, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a dissolution of marriage judgment because the trial court lacked jurisdiction where the petitioner's residency testimony was uncorroborated, violating the statutory requirement under § 61.021 F.S.
A trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage when the petitioner's residency testimony is uncorroborated, as residency is a jurisdictional prerequisite under § 61.021 F.S.
[1] Residency under § 61.021 F.S. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatricia Jane Lemon testified she had resided in Florida for about sixteen years but provided no corroborating witness testimony; she mentioned having…
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HOBSON, Judge.
Respondent Richard Arliss Lemon appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, contending that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to proceed to final judgment where the petitioner’s testimony as to residency was not corroborated.
The record on appeal contains the transcript of a hearing held on June 26, 1974. At that hearing petitioner Patricia Jane Lemon testified that she had resided in Florida for about sixteen years, but her testimony was not corroborated by any other witness. She also stated that she had a voter’s registration and driver’s license, but these were not introduced into evidence.
The courts of Florida have held that the residency requirement of § 61.021 F.S. and its predecessor is jurisdictional. Wade v. Wade, 1927, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374; Chisholm v. Chisholm, 1929, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694; Phillips v. Phillips, 1941, 146 Fla. 311, 1 So. 2d 186; Kutner v. Kutner, 1947, 159 Fla. 870, 33 So. 2d 42; Wise v. Wise, Fla.App. 1st 1975, 310 So. 2d 431. The Florida residency requirement may not be established by the uncorrobor ated testimony of the petitioner. Sec. 61.-052(2) F.S.; Phillips, supra; Kutner, supra; Wise, supra. See Caizza v. Caizza, Fla. 1974, 291 So. 2d 569.
Since petitioner failed to establish the statutory prerequisite of residence, the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final judgment.
Reversed.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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McNeil v. Jenkins-McNeil (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…s registration card, a valid Florida identification card issued under [section] 322.051, or the testimony or affidavit of a third party.” The residency requirement may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of one party, Lemon v. Lemon, 314 So. 2d 623, 623-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), nor can the requirement of corroborating evidence be waived by admission by the parties in the pleadings that the residency requirement has been met. Grey v. Grey, 995 So. 2d 623, 623-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Fernand…
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Speigner v. Speigner, 621 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…rated.” Compliance with the section 61.-021 residence requirement has long been held to be jurisdictional. See Phillips v. Phillips, 146 Fla. 311, 1 So. 2d 186 (1941); Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929); Gillman; Lemon v. Lemon, 314 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Wise v. Wise, 310 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Unless compliance with the residence requirement is both pleaded and proved, jurisdiction is lacking to enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Wise. Compliance with th…
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Fernandez v. Fernandez, 632 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…adings established jurisdiction. See Speigner. Generally, the one filing an action and seeking a dissolution of the marriage testifies and while doing so testifies as to residency. In such a case that testimony must be corroborated. Lemon v. Lemon, 314 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). No hardship can be worked on the parties by requiring corroboration of a plaintiffs testimony as to bona fide residence. If a plaintiff is a bona fide resident, some of his friends and acquaintances will know about it and be in a…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McNeil v. Jenkins-McNeil (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Frederic G. Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196 (Fla. 1929)
- Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004 (Fla. 1927)
- Almina Dahlin Phillips v. Phillips, 146 Fla. 311 (Fla. 1941)
- Horowitz v. Rossdale CLE, Inc. (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)
- Brawner v. Pixie Dev. Corp., 310 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Kutner v. Kutner, 159 Fla. 870 (Fla. 1947)
- State ex rel. J. Tom Watson v. Clements, 146 Fla. 394 (Fla. 1941)
- In re Transition Rule 17. Excusing Prospective State-Wide Grand Jurors, 291 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1974)
- Caizza v. Nello Caizza, 291 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1974)