LOIS A. HYATT, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES E. HYATT, APPELLEE
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Ex-wife Lois Hyatt appeals a divorce judgment seeking to challenge the alimony award, the trial court's refusal to retain jurisdiction for future alimony modifications, and the allocation of appraiser fees. The court affirms the lump sum alimony and fee allocation but reverses and remands regarding the trial court's failure to reserve jurisdiction for potential future alimony adjustments.
The court affirmed the lump sum alimony award and the fee assessment as within the trial court's discretion, but reversed and remanded on the issue of retained jurisdiction. The trial court must amend the judgment to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future if changed circumstances warrant support for the ex-wife.
[1] A trial court's award of lump sum alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[2] A trial court may abuse its discretion in awarding lump sum alimony if the award is insufficient to maintain the established standard of living during the marriage.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we conclude that the effect of the alimony provision was to furnish appellant, ex-wife, with monthly amounts for a certain period of years which were not shown conclusively to be more than would be needed annually for the maintenance and support of herself on which she was entitled to live during that period, with a reasonable probability that she may be left at the end of such period at an age of approximately 50 without the support for which she may have need.”
Establishes the court's reasoning for why the lump sum award without reserved jurisdiction was inadequate and unfair to the ex-wife.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced and the trial court awarded the ex-wife $87,000 as lump sum alimony payable monthly over five years plus the ex-husband's eq…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, ex-wife, seeks review of a final dissolution of marriage judgment. She urges three points for reversal: (1) the "trial court abused its discretion in awarding her $87,000 as lump sum alimony payable monthly over a period of five years plus her ex-husband’s equity in the marital residence in light of her ex-husband’s average yearly income and net worth and their established standard of living during the marriage; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of allowing further alimony after the expiration of five years should the circumstances and needs of appellant so require; and (3) the trial court erred in assessing against the wife $3,750 representing one-half of the appraiser’s fee where the financial status and potential of the ex-husband was vastly superior to that of the wife.
As to points one and three, after a consideration of the record on appeal, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion with respect thereto and the judgment pertaining to these matters is affirmed. See, e. g., Lee v. Lee, Fla.App.1972, 262 So. 2d 6 and Rine v. Rine, Fla.App.1970, 240 So. 2d 655.
Turning to point two, we conclude that the effect of the alimony provision was to furnish appellant, ex-wife, with monthly amounts for a certain period of years which were not shown conclusively to be more than would be needed annually for the maintenance and support of herself on which she was entitled to live during that period, with a reasonable probability that she may be left at the end of such period at an age of approximately 50 without the support for which she may have need.
Accordingly, we hereby remand the cause to the trial court with directions to amend the judgment to include a reservation of jurisdiction by the trial court to award to the appellant, ex-wife, in addition to the granted lump sum alimony, periodic alimony at such time or times and in such amount or amounts as it may be made by her. to appear, from changes in circumstances of the parties, to have become necessary or reasonably required for her support. See Greene v. Greene, Fla.App.1972, 256 So. 2d 258 and Cf. Melin v. Melin, Fla.App.1972, 265 So. 2d 414; Reback v. Reback, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 541; Schwartz v. Schwartz, Fla.App.1974, 297 So. 2d 117.
We also considered the issue raised by appellee, ex-husband, on cross-appeal and find that to be lacking in merit.
In all other respects the final judgment herein appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.
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Cited By (12 total)
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Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)…iodic alimony awards if justified by the evidence. The collective use of such alimony awards has been approved recently by this Court in McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1979), and by the Third District Court of Appeal. See Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 300 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Although the award of lump sum alimony is not dependent upon a finding of a prior vested right, there does arise upon the entry of a final judgment of a lump sum awa…
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Price v. Price, 389 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s failure to retain jurisdiction to enter periodic alimony at the expiration of the lump sum installments. Although retention of jurisdiction is permitted, Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra; Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Langston v. Langston, 251 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), it is not required. Elkins v. Elkins, 287 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Poe v. Poe, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Cf. Greene v. Greene, 256 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 19…
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Bird v. Bird, 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…iodic alimony awards if justified by the evidence. The collective use of such alimony awards has been approved recently by this Court in McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1979), and by the Third District Court of Appeal. See Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So. 2d 11 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 300 So. 2d 694 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). 382 So. 2d 1201. In the case at bar the trial court found, and the record supports, that the wife had a special equity in the husband’s taxi business. This interest wa…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Greene v. Greene, 256 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Peggie Melin v. Melin, 265 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- LEE v. LEE, 262 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Bergliette B. Rine v. Rine, 240 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)