THE CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
v.
CLAUDE PAYNE

Fla. | 1943-06-25
BROWN, THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ„ concur.
153 Fla. 223 Florida Supreme Court (1943) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 14 So. 2d 387
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court quashed a writ of certiorari, finding that the Circuit Court's order remanding a case for a new trial was not a final judgment and therefore not reviewable by certiorari.


Holding

No, an order remanding a case for a new trial is not a final judgment and therefore cannot be reviewed by certiorari.


Key Quotes

“it appears that the judgment which is sought to be reviewed is not a final judgment [*224] disposing of the cause and, therefore, we may not review the same on certiorari.”

Establishes the primary reason for quashing the writ.

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Facts & Procedural History

The City of Miami appealed a Circuit Court order that reversed a municipal court conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The City sought rev…

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Opinion of the Court

On appeal to Circuit Court from judgment of conviction in municipal court, the Circuit Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the cause for new trial in the municipal court.

The City of Miami seeks review of order of Circuit Court on certiorari to this Court. Writ of certiorari was awarded here on June 7, 1943.

On consideration of the record, it appears that the judgment which is sought to be reviewed is not a final judgment *224disposing of the cause and, therefore, we may not review the same on certiorari. See Brundage v. O’Berry, 101 Fla. 321, 134 So. 520; Holmberg v. Toomer, 78 Fla. 116, 82 So. 620; Rifas v. Gross (Fla.) 143 So. 600; Kroier v. Kroier, 95 Fla. 865, 116 So. 753; 755; First National Bank v. Gibbs, 78 Fla. 118, 82 So. 618. This applies to a remand for a new trial. Waddell v. McAllister, 97 Fla. 1054, 122 So. 578.

So the Writ is quashed.

So ordered.

BROWN, THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ„ concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Mandell v. Fortenberry, 290 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974)
    …. Florida White Pressed Brick Co. [56 Fla. 116], 47 So. 942 (Fla.1908); Helton v. Sinclair [93 Fla. 1121], 113 So. 568 (Fla.1927); Voges v. Ward [98 Fla. 304], 123 So. 785 (Fla.1929); Kaufman [Kauffman] v. International Harvester Co. [153 Fla. 188], 14 So. 2d 387 (Fla.1943); Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., [101 Fla. 913], 132 So. 817 (Fla.1931). By allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their full individual rights to possess the encumbered property that the debt was created to acquire in addition to t…
  • Romanach v. A. J. Armstrong Co., Inc., 172 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1965)
    …la. 709, 109 So. 677; American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942; Helton v. Sinclair, 93 Fla. 1121, 113 So. 568; Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785; Kaufman v. International Harvester Co., 153 Fla. 188, 14 So. 2d 387; Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Company, 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817; and Intertype Corporation v. Pulver, 101 Fla. 1180, 135 So. 793, relied upon by the petitioners, The testimony of the rpresenta-tive of the respondent was to the effect that “…
  • Cecil Holland Ford, Inc. v. Jameson, 132 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
    …ceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817; Commercial Credit Co. v. Miller, 111 Fla. 554, 149 So. 482; Central Farmers’ Trust Co. v. McCampbell Furniture Stores, Inc., 128 Fla. 60, 174 So. 748'; Kauffman v. International Harvester Co., 153 Fla. 188, 14 So. 2d 387. The appellant, having first sought recovery of the sales price, treated the sale as absolute and would not thereafter be permitted to retake possession. Where, as here, the automobile has not been redelivered to the appellee upon forthcoming bond,…

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