DAVID GARY QUALLS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Gary Qualls appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to drug possession charges. The court affirmed the trial court's discretionary decision, holding that Qualls failed to demonstrate good cause for withdrawal where his guilty plea was voluntary and entered upon advice of counsel.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Qualls failed to demonstrate good cause because: (1) he alleged no prejudice regarding the factual basis, and (2) his guilty plea was entered voluntarily upon advice of counsel and his later assertion to the contrary was refuted by his own testimony at the ABA hearing.
[1] A trial court may, in its discretion, permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn for good cause shown at any time before sentencing.
[2] A defendant's assertion that a guilty plea was entered based on advice from counsel does not constitute good cause for withdrawal if the defendant later denies this advic…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant often pleads guilty after consultation and advice from his attorney. Such a decision is a tactical one and may not be whimsically revoked at a later time.”
Establishes the legal principle that guilty pleas made upon attorney advice are tactical decisions that cannot be easily withdrawn.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceQualls pleaded guilty to possession of over five grams of marijuana and violation of the drug abuse law, and was placed on probation. He later moved t…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was placed on probation after pleading guilty to possession of over five grams of marijuana and viola tion of the drug abuse law. On appeal he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial on the merits. We affirm.
Rule 3.170(f), F.Cr.P., provides:
“(f) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. The court may, in its discretion, and shall upon good cause, at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn and, if judgment of conviction has been entered thereof, set aside such judgment, and allow a plea of not guilty, or, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney, allow a plea of guilty of a lesser included offense, or of a lesser degree of the offense charged, to be substituted for the plea of guilty.
“The fact that a defendant may have entered a plea of guilty and later withdrawn said plea, may not be used against him in a trial of that cause.”
Appellant contends good cause was shown based on two factors, (1) that the factual basis did not allege a prima facie case against him, and (2) because his public defender advised him that he could plead guilty and get probation. “He [public defender] said it was the easiest way out.” With regard to the factual basis, appellant alleges no prejudice; therefore, any alleged insufficiency does not constitute reversible error. Willis v. State, 312 So. 2d 522, Fourth District Court of Appeal, opinion filed May 16, 1975. With regard to the second basis, the language in State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408, at 411, (3d DCA Fla.1973) is applicable:
“A defendant often pleads guilty after consultation and advice from his attorney. Such a decision is a tactical one and may not be whimsically revoked at a later time. Belsky v. State, Fla.App.1970, 231 So. 2d 256; Simpson v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So. 2d 224. Where, as here, the guilty plea was entered upon advice of counsel and where the record shows a full examination by the court and the defendant’s concurrence in the plea, the record clearly refutes the defendant’s later assertion that the plea was not voluntary.”
Additionally, at the ABA hearing appellant specifically denied he was pleading guilty because his attorney advised him to do so.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.
OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and DOW-NEY, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Joyner v. State, 583 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…at, here, the motion came only a matter of days after the sentence. However, in the absence of a per se reversal rule, such timing is simply an additional factor for the trial court to consider. Therefore, the order is affirmed. Cf. Qualls v. State, 315 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). See also Staggers v. State, 564 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Morgan v. State, 414 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). HERSEY and STONE, JJ., concur. GLICKSTEIN, C.J., dissents with opinion.…
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Humphries v. State, 336 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…factual basis for the plea was adduced, that appellant understood the effect of the plea and that the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion in denying the subsequent motion to withdraw the plea. (See Qualls v. State, Fla.App. 4th 1975, 315 So. 2d 482) However, we do not agree with the State’s contention that a plea of nolo contendere is etched in granite and may not be withdrawn. Although this case does not involve a situation in which the trial judge failed to concur in a plea agreement within…
Authorities Cited
- Simpson v. State, 164 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Belsky v. State, 231 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Willis v. State, 312 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)