PATRICK CRITCHLOW, APPELLANT,
v.
WFC MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The court held that the employment contract was for an indefinite period, allowing either party to terminate it at any time within the initial 90 days without cause.
[1] An employment contract allowing either party to terminate within an initial period is for an indefinite term.
[2] When a period of employment under an employment contract is indefinite, either party may terminate it at any time.
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Patrick Critchlow, brought suit for damages against WFC Mortgage Company, Inc., for an alleged breach’ of a written employment contract. From an adverse judgment on the pleadings Critchlow appeals.
The complaint set forth the employment contract, the salient portions of which provided that Critchlow was to be employed for a period of 90 days, at the end of which period, WFC Mortgage Company, at its option, could enter into a contract with Critchlow for a period of one year; and that during such initial 90 day period both parties to the contract would have the right to terminate the contract. The record shows that WFC terminated the contract, without cause, some 16 days after its execution. Critchlow contends that the provision of the contract giving both parties the right to terminate during the 90 day period requires factual interpretation; that judgment on the pleadings was precluded, as by its terms, the contract could not be terminated without good cause and that, therefore, the trial court erred in entering such judgment on the pleadings under Rule 1.140(c), RCP, because the complaint stated a good cause of action. WFC contends that such judgment was proper as termination or discharge with a showing of good cause was not necessary or contemplated by the express terms of the written employment contract. We agree and affirm.
The employment agreement was for an indefinite period of time since both parties retained the right to terminate it at any time within 90 days of execution. When a period of employment under an employment contract is indefinite, either party may terminate it at any time. Hope v. National Airlines, Fla.App.1957, 99 So. 2d 244. The trial court may consider undisputed facts appearing in all the pleadings in determining the propriety of a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Paradise Pools v. Genauer, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 860.
Therefore, we find that Critchlow’s complaint, taken together with the exhibit attached thereto does not state a cause of action as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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DeMARCO v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the employment contract. Wynne v. Ludman Corporation, 79 So. 2d 690 (Fla.1955); Sher v. Shower Door Company of America, 197 So. 2d 333 (Fla.3d DCA 1967); Critchlow v. WFC Mortgage Company, Inc., 315 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The employment agreement in the case at bar having been for an indefinite time, Publix could terminate DeMarco for any reason without incurring liability. Thus, Publix was not liable for firing him for the reason that he was exer…
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Schwartz v. Greico, 901 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…th of the net proceeds of the sale.... ” The Former Husband’s obligation as required by section 14 is plain. The pleadings do not indicate any circumstances that would cast doubt on the Former Husband’s obligation. See Critchlow v. WFC Mortgage Co., 315 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“The trial court may consider undisputed facts appearing in all the pleadings in determining the propriety of a motion for a judgment on the pleadings.”). Further, the contract does not contain the sort of contradictory lan…
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Judson Lewis and Eduardo Osorio v. Compton, 416 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…atutes (1976); 8 Fla.Jur.2d Business Relationships § 139. Nor will Compton have a cause of action sounding in contract, since the period of employment was of indefinite duration and, thus, terminable at will. Critchlow v. WFC Mortgage Company, Inc., 315 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); see also Harrison v. Jack Eckerd Corporation, 342 F.Supp. 348 (M.D.Fla.1972), aff’d mem., 468 F. 2d 951 (5th Cir.1972). Having concluded that Compton’s status was that of…
Authorities Cited
- Paradise Pools, Inc. v. Genauer, 104 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Hope v. Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)