BAY ISLAND TOWERS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
BAY ISLAND-SIESTA ASSOCIATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1975-08-15
No. 74-300
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
316 So. 2d 574 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Bay Island Towers sought to build a high-rise apartment on lots that were originally exempted from single-family dwelling restrictions under the subdivision's Declaration of Restrictions. The trial court upheld a 1973 modification by majority vote and the developer's widow that eliminated the exemptions for lots 1-4, restricting them to single-family residential use. The appellate court affirmed, holding the modification was reasonable and consistent with the original development scheme.


Holding

The modification was valid and enforceable because it was not unreasonable with respect to the general scheme of development. The record showed that only garden apartments, not high-rise structures, were contemplated by the developer for those lots, making the modification consistent with the original development plan.


Headnotes

[1] A modification of subdivision restrictions is valid if it is reasonable and does not destroy the general scheme of development.

[2] A declaration of restrictions may be modified by the grantors, their heirs, assigns, or representatives and a majority of the lot owners in the subdivision.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A modification of restrictions according to the provisions of the declaration is valid if it is not unreasonable with respect to the general scheme of the development.”

Establishes the controlling legal standard for evaluating modifications of subdivision restrictions.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

In 1952, a subdivision was created with a Declaration of Restrictions allowing apartment buildings on Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, but restricting other lots …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant wishes to build a high-rise apartment on its property described as Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 in a subdivision known as Bay Island Shores, Unit # 1. Accordingly, appellant filed a suit for declaratory judgment in the lower court to declare invalid and unenforceable a modification of subdivision restrictions by a majority of the lot owners in the subdivision with the consent of the developer’s widow. A final judgment was entered finding the modification of the declaration of restrictions to be valid and enforceable. Appellant appeals this final judgment.

The facts in the record show that in March 1952 a plat was recorded subdividing the property into 37 lots. In April 1952 the developers, Mr. and Mrs. Tribolet, recorded a declaration of restrictions. The pertinent portions of these restrictions as applied to this case are as follows:

“1. No lot or land in said subdivision, or any part thereof, shall be used for any other than residential purposes and that with the exceptions of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, only one single one-family dwelling house shall be built on any one Lot.

**

“7. No lot in this subdivision shall be used for business or commercial purposes. However, apartment buildings shall be allowed to be erected on Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4.

**

“14. The foregoing restrictions, conditions, covenants and reservations may be modified, amended or entirely rescinded by and with the consent of the grantors, their heirs, assigns or representatives and a majority of the owners of lots in said subdivision.”

In January 1973, the modification of the existing restrictions was executed in accordance with paragraph 14 quoted above. The original restrictions, as can be seen from paragraphs 1 and 7 quoted above, restricted all lots with the exception of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 to one single one-family dwelling houses. Also, all lots were prohibited to be used for business or commercial purposes with a proviso that apartment buildings would be allowed to be erected on Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. The modification of these restrictions, which is the subject of this appeal, provided that no lot or land in the subdivision shall be used for any other than residential purposes and only one single one-family dwelling house shall be built on any one lot. The modification further provided that no lot in the subdivision shall be used for business or commercial purposes. The effect of the modification was to do away with the exemptions as to Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 which were contained in the original restrictions. Numerous and sundry things took place between 1952 and 1973, which are not necessary to set forth herein in order to dispose of this appeal.

A modification of restrictions according to the provisions of the declaration is valid if it is not unreasonable with respect to the general scheme of the development. Thus, in Flamingo Ranch Est., Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches H., Inc., Fla.App. 4th, 1974, 303 So. 2d 665, the court stated:

“ . . . We hold, therefore, that the clause in the Declaration of Restrictions, which reserves to the owner ‘the right to alter, amend, repeal or modify these restrictions at any time in its sole discretion’ is a valid clause so long as it is exercised in a reasonable manner as not to destroy the general scheme or plan of development.”

See also Johnson v. Three Bays Properties # 2, Inc., Fla.App.3d, 1964, 159 So. 2d 924.

The record is sufficient to support the reasonableness of this modification, particularly when it is evident that only garden apartments rather than highrise structures were contemplated by the developer for these lots in the first place. There is also competent substantial evidence to support the rejection of appellant’s contention of estoppel as well as its other claims.

Affirmed.

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Cudjoe Gardens Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Payne, 779 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …against the association, this time on the ground1 that the deed restrictions, as previously amended by a majority vote of the property owners as provided in the original, recorded Declaration, see Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Ass’n, 316 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), were void because the written ballots of the property owners did not comply with the two-witness requirement of Florida’s version of the Statute of Deeds, section 689.01, Florida Statutes (2000). The association again appeals an…
    1 / 2
  • Carrigan & Boland, Inc. v. Worrock, 402 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
    …4th DCA 1974); Johnson v. Three Bays Properties #2, Inc., 159 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). The amendment in the instant case did not unreasonably destroy “a general scheme of development.” Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Association, 316 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). In the instant situation, the evidence clearly shows that the developer made diligent and earnest attempts to gain the requisite permission for construction of the docking facilities, and that the amendment was based on the princ…
  • Golian v. Polhironakis, 390 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
    …ent, despite the broad language of the reservation provision, the developer could only amend the restrictions in a reasonable manner consistent with the general scheme or plan of development. Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Association, 316 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowners, Inc., 303 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). We affirm the judgment which enjoins a violation of the restrictions. SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw