LEONARD JOSEPH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Leonard Joseph was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery, robbery, and larceny of a motor vehicle, and sentenced to life imprisonment on the first two counts and five years on the third, all consecutive. On appeal, Joseph challenged the trial court's order requiring him to speak a phrase for voice identification purposes, the admission of his refusal to do so, and the imposition of consecutive sentences, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed all convictions and sentences.
The court affirmed all convictions and sentences. The compelled speech for voice identification does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The victim's testimony regarding Joseph's refusal to speak the phrase was admissible. The trial court properly imposed separate sentences for the three distinct offenses because each crime was complete in itself and constituted a separate offense.
[1] Compelling a defendant to speak a phrase in the presence of a victim for voice identification purposes does not violate the constitutional right against self-incriminatio…
[2] A defendant's refusal to comply with a court order to speak a phrase for identification purposes, if not objected to or moved to strike, is not preserved for appellate re…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This point has been decided adversely to such a contention in a number of cases.”
The court rejected Joseph's claim that compelled voice identification violates the Fifth Amendment, citing multiple federal and state precedents.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring the commission of a robbery at a dwelling house, the robber spoke a certain phrase. At trial, the court ordered Joseph to speak this same phras…
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OWEN, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of (1) breaking and entering a dwelling house while armed with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: robbery, (2) robbery, and (3) larceny of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life on each of the first two and for five years on the last, all to run consecutively. No error has been demonstrated and the several judgments and the respective sentence on each are severally affirmed.
Appellant’s first point is that it was error for the trial court to order him to speak a certain phrase (stated by the victim to have been said by the robber during the commission of the crime) in the presence of the victim for the purposes of voice identification by the latter, appellant contending that this was a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. This point has been decided adversely to such .a contention in a number of cases. See, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); United States v. Ryan, 478 F. 2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973); Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F. 2d 177 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 145, 27 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1970); Boyer v. State, 182 So. 2d 19 (4th DCA Fla.1966).
Appellant’s second point is somewhat related to the first. He contends that when he refused to speak a phrase as ordered by the court it was error for the court to permit the witness to state in the presence of the jury that the defendant had refused to speak the phrase as ordered by the court. There was no objection to the question as propounded to the witness, nor any motion to strike his answer, and thus there is no judicial error properly preserved upon which to raise this point. However, the point even if properly raised on appeal, is without merit. See, Higgins v. Wainwright, supra; Boyer v. State, supra.
Appellant’s final point is that the three offenses, being all part of a “single transaction”, required the court to impose a single sentence limited to that of the highest offense. There is no merit to this point. Appellant committed three separate and distinct crimes each complete in itself and related to the others only in that the several crimes involved the same victims and occurred on the same date. While armed, appellant broke and entered a dwelling house with an intent to commit robbery. That offense was complete upon the breaking and entering with the requisite intent. Appellant thereafter robbed the occupants of the dwelling. Upon leaving the house appellant stole the owners’ motor vehicle which was parked on the premises. Each offense was separate and distinct and justified a separate sentence. See, Estevez v. State, Fla.Sup.Ct., 313 So. 2d 692, opinion filed February 26, 1975; Pettigrew v. State, 295 So. 2d 672 (4th DCA Fla.1974); White v. State, 274 So. 2d 6 (4th DCA Fla.1973); State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174 (4th DCA Fla.1971).
Affirmed.
WALDEN, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1979)…xercise of this right. Since the fifth amendment offers no protection against compulsion to submit a voice exemplar and since it does not privilege refusal to submit, the admission of Clark’s refusal into evidence was not error. See Joseph v. State, 316 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Boyer v. State, 182 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F. 2d 177 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 145, 27 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court’s instruc…
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Taylor v. State, 425 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…ation, one robbery has been committed .... As evident from the facts previously recited in the case at bar, the distinctions in both time and spatial relationships between the two offenses reveal two separate acts of theft. Compare Joseph v. State, 316 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Therefore, we affirm appellant’s second point. Appellant raises a third error relative to a facial conflict between his written sentence and written probation order. The former document states that his sentence is for a term of…
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Castelberry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…erent result because, as previously discussed, only one violation of the criminal statutes occurred with respect to this aspect of the appellants’ course of conduct. We also view our conclusion on this point as not inconsistent with Joseph v. State, 316 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cited by the state. In Joseph, unlike the present case, there was no indication that the perpetrator obtained the automobile by force, violence, or by putting in fear. Reiterating, because possession of the car, like all the re…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1967)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966)
- Ciro Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975)
- Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970)
- Higgins v. Louie L. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1970)
- State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Campbell v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 400 U.S. 905 (U.S. 1970)
- Anderson v. United States, 400 U.S. 905 (U.S. 1970)
- White v. State, 274 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- United States v. Mickey John Ryan, 478 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973)