VIRGINIA STARK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Virginia Stark was convicted of selling stolen automobiles with altered vehicle identification numbers, but the Florida Court of Appeal reversed because the State failed to prove she had knowledge of the VIN alteration at the time of sale. The court held that for specific intent crimes, an aider and abettor's liability requires proof that they either possessed the requisite intent themselves or knew the principal possessed it.
Stark is entitled to discharge because the State failed to prove she had knowledge of the VIN alteration at the time of sale. For a specific intent crime, when the State relies on an aiding and abetting theory, it must affirmatively prove the aider and abettor either possessed the requisite intent themselves or knew the principal possessed it; general criminal intent to aid in selling stolen cars is insufficient.
[1] A conviction for selling a motor vehicle with an altered identification number requires proof of knowledge of the alteration at the time of sale.
[2] The State bears the burden of affirmatively proving specific intent in a specific intent crime, either directly or circumstantially.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Fla.Stat. § 319.33(1) (d) is a specific intent crime and as such the State has the burden of affirmatively proving by direct or circumstantial evidence that the act was done with the requisite specific intent.”
Establishes the foundational principle that specific intent crimes require the State to prove the defendant's mental state
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStark participated in an automobile theft ring with a division of labor: one member stole vehicles, another altered the vehicle identification numbers…
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OWEN, Judge.
Virginia Stark was without doubt involved in an automobile theft ring. However, the evidence adduced at her jury trial for the alleged violation of Fla.Stat. § 319.33(1) (d) (1971)1 was insufficient to show that at the time she sold the stolen automobile she had knowledge of the alteration of the vehicle identification number. She is therefore entitled to be discharged.
Fla.Stat. § 319.33(1) (d) is a specific intent crime and as such the State has the burden of affirmatively proving by direct or circumstantial evidence that the act was done with the requisite specific intent. Allen v. State, 124 So. 2d 741 (1st DCA Fla. 1960). The State’s case established that the modus operandi was for one member of the ring to steal the automobile from a restaurant parking lot, another member to alter the nonconfidential vehicle identification number, and still another to obtain a new registration for the vehicle. Stark helped sell two of the automobiles, knowing them to have been stolen, the vehicles being sold to acquaintances of hers for a small fraction of their respective market value. However, there is not the slightest evidence from which it reasonably could be inferred that Stark had any knowledge that the manufacturer’s vehicle identification number had been destroyed, removed, altered, etc. at the time she participated in their sale.
The State takes the position that Stark was an aider and abettor in the scheme to sell stolen automobiles, and having this criminal intent her actual knowledge of the alteration of the vehicle identification numbers became irrelevant, citing as authority for its position the case of Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (1st DCA Fla. 1973). That case, setting forth the general rule applicable to general intent crimes, has no application to the specific intent crime involved here.
Where the State, in charging a specific intent crime, relies upon an aiding and abetting theory, as in the case at bar, it has an affirmative burden to prove the requisite intent. It can do so either by showing the aider and abettor had the requisite intent himself, or that he knew that the principal had that intent. See, Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909 (1882); Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1922); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 123 (1965); 22 CJS Criminal Law § 87, at 259 (1961). This same rule applies to the specific element of knowledge. See, Espinoza v. State, 183 So. 2d 560 (3rd DCA Fla. 1966). The State’s evidence in this case failed to meet this requirement.
The judgment appealed is reversed and upon remand the trial court is respectfully directed to enter an order discharging appellant.
CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur. . Fla.Stat. § 319.33(1) (d) (1971) provides:
“ (1) It is unlawful:
' * * * * *
“(d) To sell or offer for sale in this state a motor vehicle on which the motor number or manufacturer’s serial number has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced with knowledge of such destruction, removal, covering, alteration, or defacement of said motor number or manufacturer’s serial number ;
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Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1988)…oner waited in the car across the street while the robbery and murder took place, and then drove the getaway car. From this combination of factors, the jury could legitimately infer that petitioner was a participant in the crime. See Stark v. State, 316 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (where state relies on aiding and abetting theory, it can prove intent either by showing aider and abettor had the requisite intent himself, or knew the principal had that intent), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla.1976). Ac…
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Evans v. State, 643 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…be proven in other ways. Two of Florida’s district courts of appeal have held that intent may be proven either by showing that the aider and abettor had the requisite intent himself, or that he knew that the principal had the intent. Stark v. State, 316 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla.1976); S.G. v. State, 591 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Evans admitted by his own statement that he knew that the principals had the intent to commit the crime before they left the house. Thus…
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West v. State, 585 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…hat the offense is being committed nor mere presence at the scene nor a display of questionable behavior after the fact is equivalent to participation with criminal intent. 519 So. 2d at 624. See also Collins, 438 So. 2d at 1038.3 In Stark v. State, 316 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla.1976), this court held that when the state relies on the aiding and abetting theory, it can prove intent either by showing that the defendant had requisite intent himself or that he knew th…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428 (Fla. 1922)
- Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909 (Fla. 1882)
- Allen v. State, 124 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Gunter v. Gunter, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Rane Gilbert Espinoza v. State, 183 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)