FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
v.
SCHWOB COMPANY OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that an individual operating a business and then forming a corporation to acquire it cannot claim the individual's prior experience for the corporation's unemployment contribution rate.
Appellee corporation acquired a business formerly operated by an individual who owned all but qualifying shares. The individual exercised absolute con…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Alter Ego Doctrine cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellee filed its petition in the Circuit Court of Leon County for the purpose of obtaining a redetermination of its rate of contribution under the Florida Unemployment Compensation Act. For more than three years prior to July, 1940, Simon Schwob, as an individual, was operating a chain of clothing stores under the name of The Schwob Company, and was an employer under the Florida Unemployment Compensation Act. In July, 1940, appellee corporation was formed and acquired the identical business formerly operated by The Schwob Company. Simon Schwob owned all stock in the corporation except qualifying shares issued to other parties at his direction. ■ Schwob exercised absolute control and supervision over the business just as he had done theretofore and by virtue of such facts claims the benefit of the three years’ experience of Schwob, the individual. The circuit court granted the petition and the Commission appeals.
Section 443.08, Fla. Stat. 1941, provides:
“(d) Employers shall be eligible for rate variations from *357the standard rate of contributions, as hereinafter described in any calendar year, only if their employment records have been chargeable with benefit payments throughout the three consecutive calendar years ending on December 31 of the preceding calendar year.”
Even a court of equity ordinarily will not pierce the corporate veil in the absence of fraud. The person holding himself out as the alter ego of a corporation may not ask that the corporate identity be cast aside to avoid payments required by law.
Our conclusion is that the Commission correctly interpreted the law as it existed when the application was made. For the benefit of the bar, we call attention to an amendment to Section 443.08, Chapter 21981, Acts of 1943.
The decree is reversed.
BUFORD, C. J., BROWN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cornelia ANN Fowler and Trustee under the last will and testament of John A. Cunningham v. Augustus G. Hartridge, 156 Fla. 585 (Fla. 1945)…ce the corporate veil and deal directly with the parties without regard to their legal entity where the corporation has been used in a manner so as to mislead or to perpetrate a fraud upon a creditor. See Florida Industrial Commission v. Schwob Co., 153 Fla. 356, 14 So. (2nd) 666; Riesen v. Maryland Casualty Company, 153 Fla. 205, 14 So. (2nd) 197. In this case Hartridge had notice of Cunningham’s demise and [*592] notice of the corporate existence and its ownership of the leasehold estate. We find no eleme…
-
THE Tex. Co. v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 155 Fla. 536 (Fla. 1945)…ction 7 of Division III of Section 443.03, Fla. Stats. 1941 (F.S.A.), and other authorities. Counsel for appellee contend that the several contentions of the appellant are placed at rest by our holding in Florida Industrial Commission v. Schwob Co., 153 Fla. 356, 14 So. (2nd) 666. Careful consideration by the Court has been given to this controversy and the several contentions of counsel for the respective parties. Chief Justice CHAPMAN and Justices TERRELL, BROWN, THOMAS and SEBRING are of the view that t…