STATE EX REL. JULIUS MULLINS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE HONORABLE THOMAS T. TRETTIS, AS JUDGE OF THE COUNTY COURT IN AND FOR COLLIER COUNTY FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1975-08-15
No. 74-123
GRIMES, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.
316 So. 2d 617 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that the defendant was not continuously available for trial, and the speedy trial period did not begin until his re-arrest.

Facts & Procedural History

Mullins was arrested, failed to appear for arraignment, was re-arrested, and then sought discharge for denial of a speedy trial. The trial court denie…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Speedy Trial Right

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Opinion of the Court
HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.

HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.

The sole question on this appeal is whether or not Mullins was continuously available for trial on a misdemeanor charge during the 90-day period established by R.Cr.P. 3.191(a)(1).

The record shows that Mullins was arrested on June 30, 1973, was advised to appear for arraignment on July 11, 1973, and signed a document so notifying him of the arraignment date. He did not appear at the arraignment; whereupon, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest and he was re-arrested on or about August 15, 1973. He appeared before the court on August 15, 1973, at which time he pled not guilty and trial was set for October 9, 1973. Mullins filed his motion for discharge on the ground that he was denied a speedy trial, which motion was denied on October 3, 1973.

The court held that under R.Cr.P. 3.-191(e) the State had shown the non-availability of Mullins during the 90-day period from his original arrest; that the 90 days did not begin to run until he was re-arrested on August 15, 1973; and that the trial date of October 9, 1973 was within the 90-day period. He further ruled that Mullins did not establish his continuous availability during the 90-day period from his original arrest by competent proof as required by R.Cr.P. 3.191(e).

We agree with the trial court’s ruling and, therefore, the order appealed is

Affirmed.

GRIMES, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Peterson v. State, 382 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
    …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Mullins v. Trettis, 316 So. 2d 617 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). BERANEK, GLICKSTEIN and HURLEY, JJ., concur.…
  • Cave v. State of Fla. & Hon. Charles E. Miner, 389 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
    …waive extradition was an act on his part making himself unavailable for trial. Upon being retaken into custody, under the clear terms of the rule, the time within which the trial is to commence shall begin anew. See State ex rel. Mullins v. Trettis, 316 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975). We find no reason not to apply the plain meaning of those emphasized words. Because less than 180 days had expired from the time the State of Florida reob-tained custody of the petitioner until he was brought to trial, we find…

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