ALDA PHYLLIS FELDMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
AL FELDMAN, APPELLEE
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Ex-wife Alda Feldman appeals a post-decree order modifying alimony and child support payments downward. The trial court reduced total monthly payments from $2,750 to $1,500 and shifted child support obligation to the ex-husband based on changed circumstances, which the appellate court affirmed as a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the support obligations. Under Florida statute § 61.14, a court has authority to modify support obligations when circumstances have changed sufficiently to necessitate modification, and whether to modify alimony is within the broad discretion of the chancellor.
[1] A court is authorized to modify support and maintenance obligations when the circumstances of the parties have so changed as to necessitate such modification, regardless…
[2] Whether an alimony award should be modified rests within the broad discretion of the chancellor.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a chancellor is authorized by § 61.14, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. to modify support and maintenance obligations owing by one spouse to another when the circumstances of the parties have so changed as to necessitate such modification, regardless of whether the obligations to pay emanate from a property or separation agreement or a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Establishes the legal standard for modification of support obligations under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAl and Alda Feldman divorced on December 29, 1970, under a separation agreement requiring Al to pay $500/month alimony and $2,250/month child support.…
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[*137] PER CURIAM.
Appellant, ex-wife, takes this appeal to review a post decretal order reducing the amount of alimony and child support payments required to be made by appellee, ex-husband.
The marital ties between Al and Alda Feldman were severed on December 29, 1970. Prior thereto they executed a separation and property settlement agreement which provided, inter alia, that appellee, A1 Feldman, pay Alda $500 per month as alimony and $2,250 per month as child support. Upon the minor son, Marc, reaching the age of 21 or Alda remarrying, these sums were to be modified.
Subsequently, in November 1973, A1 Feldman, pursuant to § 61.14, Fla.Stat., F. S.A. filed a petition for modification of the terms of the 1970 property settlement agreement. Alda Feldman answered and an evidentiary hearing was held. The chancellor, impressed with the candid testimony of A1 Feldman, entered his order (1) reducing the total monthly payments to Alda Feldman from $2,750 to $1,500, (2) directing that A1 Feldman support and make direct payments to Marc (age 19) until he attains the age of 21 years, and (3) providing for a review of the alimony award on or about February 1, 1976 upon proper notice and hearing by either side. Alda Feldman appeals and contends that the chancellor abused his discretion. We cannot agree.
The established law is that a chancellor is authorized by § 61.14, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. to modify support and maintenance obligations owing by one spouse to another when the circumstances of the parties have so changed as to necessitate such modification, regardless of whether the obligations to pay emanate from a property or separation agreement or a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Posner v. Posner, Fla. 1972, 257 So. 2d 530; Martin v. Martin, Fla.App.1972, 261 So. 2d 179. Furthermore, whether or not an alimony award should be modified is within the broad discretion of the chancellor. See 10A Fla.Jur. Dissolution of Marriage § 318 (1973) and cases cited therein.
The evidence adduced at the hearing on the petition for modification revealed that A1 Feldman had suffered severe business loss and as a result of this decline in his financial condition was compelled to borrow to pay the support obligations which exceeded his income. On the other hand, Alda Feldman is gainfully employed, drives a late model automobile which is paid in full, and has in her savings approximately $45,000. Testimony further revealed that the minor son, Marc, lives in his own apartment1 and receives only $300 per month child support from his mother. Hence, we conclude that the chancellor by relieving Mrs. Feldman of her financial responsibility to support her son, Marc, and placing this obligation upon the father and increasing the alimony award from $500 to $1,500 per month was not an abuse of discretion as there was a sufficient change in the circumstances of the parties to warrant a modification of the property settlement agreement. Cf. Purcell v. Purcell, Fla.App.1969, 223 So. 2d 389; Conklin v. Conklin, Fla.App. 1973, 286 So. 2d 236.
Accordingly, the order herein appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. for which appellee currently is providing the rent.
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Schafroth v. Schafroth, 610 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…parties’ 1989 “Amended Marital Settlement Agreement.” We conclude that the trial court properly sustained her exceptions to that report on the ground that it embodied an erroneous conclusion of law. See § 61.14, Fla.Stat. (1991); Feldman v. Feldman, 317 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Because this was the case, the master’s determination — unlike a finding of fact on disputed evidence — did not bind the trial court, which was, to the contrary, required to set it aside. See Mounce v. Mounce, 459 So. 2d 437 (Fla…
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Gaddy v. Gaddy, 415 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…o modify alimony obligations when the circumstances of the parties have changed so as to require the modification. In addition, whether or not an alimony award should be modified is within the broad discretion of the trial judge. Feldman v. Feldman, 317 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The trial judge’s findings come to us clothed in the presumption of correctness. The evidence received below reflects that Nina was not employed at the time of the divorce. She was employed full time at the time of the hear…
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Keel v. Keel, 597 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ness. Gaddy v. Gaddy, 415 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The discretionary decision to modify alimony was reasonable under the instant facts, and we find no abuse of discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Feldman v. Feldman, 317 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975). Accordingly, we affirm regarding that issue. The former Husband does not dispute that he failed to make timely payments of his full alimony obligation under the original decree of dissolution, but relies on Bowen v. Bowen, 471…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sari Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972)
- Cotton v. State, 261 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Salfi v. Fla. Dev. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Purcell v. Purcell, 223 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Conklin v. Conklin, 286 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)