CHARLES SAMUEL JARRIEL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant convicted of grand larceny appeals, arguing his confession should have been suppressed. The court agrees, finding the officer improperly induced the confession through threats to arrest the defendant's wife and promises to charge only one count, violating the requirement that confessions be free from hope or fear.
The confession should have been suppressed because the defendant was improperly urged through direct or implied promises to make a statement, in violation of the requirement that a confessing defendant be entirely free from the influence of hope or fear.
[1] A confession is inadmissible if induced by direct or implied promises that create hope or fear in the defendant.
[2] A statement made by a defendant is inadmissible when law enforcement officers threaten to arrest a third party unless the defendant makes a statement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant was improperly urged by direct or implied promises to make a statement, in violation of the basic tenet of law that a confessing defendant should be entirely free from the influence of hope or fear”
The court's statement of the legal violation that occurred and the standard for involuntary confessions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer arrested the defendant at his workplace after contacting his wife. The defendant was taken to the sheriff's office for interrogation withou…
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WALDEN, Chief Judge.
After Jury trial defendant was found guilty of grand larceny. He appeals his conviction on the ground a statement made by him should have been suppressed. We agree and reverse.
After an officer had contacted defendant’s wife to find out where defendant worked, he arrested defendant at his place of employment. Defendant was taken to the Sheriffs office and placed in a room for interrogation, and at no time was he booked or his location disclosed until after his statement had been given. It is undisputed that during interrogation the officer told defendant his wife would be arrested unless they could clear this thing up (by defendant’s making a statement). The interrogating officer’s testimony included the following:
“Q Did you talk to him and tell him that you could arrest the girls and if he would tell you about the incident you wouldn’t have them arrested?
“A Based on what information I had I would have had to arrest his wife unless he could show me that she wasn’t involved and that she was along because she was his wife.
“Q And did you tell him that you would only charge him with one incident if he gave you a statement?
“A I don’t have that right. Probably if something of that nature was said I probably normally — normally the courts would only require a conviction of one of the charges and they normally don’t try them all separately. In this case I don’t recall this part of the discussion with him.”
It is undisputed that during interrogation the officer told defendant his wife would be arrested unless defendant made a statement. Further, the officer did not deny that he might have told the defendant-that he would only charge him with one in cident if the defendant would make a statement. • .
We find that the' defendant was improp.erly urged by direct or implied promises to make a statement, in violation of the basic tenet of law that a confessing defendant should be entirely free from the influence of' hope or fear. The resulting statement here should be suppressed on authority of Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); M.D.B. v. State, 311 So. 2d 399 (4th DCAFla.1975); State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (2d DCAFla.1974); Kraft v. State, 143 So. 2d 863 (2d DCAFla.1962); and 13 Fla.Jur. Evidence § 248 (1957).
Reversed and remanded.
CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Fillinger v. State, 349 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…ither hope or fear, and a confession must be excluded if the totality of the surrounding circumstances were calculated to delude the accused or to exert undue influence over him. M.D.B. v. State, 311 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). If the interrogator induces the accused to confess by using language which amounts to a threat or promise of benefit, then the confession may be untrustworthy and should be excluded. Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1958);…
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Christopher v. State, 407 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1981)…e appellant continued his conversation with the interrogating deputies of his own free will. The test for admissibility of a confession is whether it is freely and voluntarily made. Howell v. State, 66 Fla. 210, 63 So. 421 (1913); Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla.1976). Appellant claims improper coercion during the course of the interrogation. A case in which improper coercion was found is Jarriel v. State, cited above. In Jarriel the defendant was impr…
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Bova v. State, 392 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…her hope or fear, and a confession must be excluded if the totality of the surrounding circumstances were calculated to delude the accused or to exert undue influence over him. M. D. B. v. State, 311 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). If the interrogator induces the accused to confess by using language which amounts to a threat or promise of benefit, then the confession may be untrustworthy and should be excluded. Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1958); S…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1963)
- State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Clark Johnston v. Dean, 311 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Kraft v. State, 143 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)