BECK
v.
BECK
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a divorce decree, upholding the trial court's jurisdiction based on the cause of action occurring in Alachua County and approving the awarded attorney's fee as justified by the services rendered and the husband's ability to pay.
1. Yes, the Circuit Court of Alachua County had jurisdiction because the cause of action occurred materially in Alachua County. 2. Yes, the attorney's fee was entirely justified given the duration and effort involved in the litigation and the husband's financial capacity.
“while the husband was a resident of Duval County, the cause of action occurred materially in Alachua County and that the Circuit Court of the latter county had jurisdiction of the litigation.”
This quote establishes the court's reasoning for upholding the venue in Alachua County.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife was granted a divorce from her husband in the Circuit Court of Alachua County. The husband resided in Duval County. The wife's attorneys were…
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PER CURIAM.
Two questions are presented on this appeal from a final decree of divorce granted the appellee wife from her husband, in the Circuit Court of Alachua County.
As to the first question relating to venue, the record abundantly supports the finding of the Chancellor that while the husband was a resident of Duval County, the cause of action occurred materially in Alachua County and that the Circuit Court of the latter county had jurisdiction of the litigation.
On the second question, we find that the fee of $1,250 allowed in the final decree for the services of the wife’s solicitors was entirely justified. It appears that the litigation had extended over a period of more than four months, the wife’s attorneys had devoted between ninety and one hundred hours in the cause, and the amount of the fee was entirely consistent with the husband’s ability to respond.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C. J., and ROBERTS, MATHEWS and DREW, JJ., concur.