MINNIE M. SCHWARTZ, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, DAVID J. SCHWARTZ AND DAVID J. SCHWARTZ, INDIVIDUALLY,
v.
JOSEPH L. PRIEST

Fla. | 1943-07-30
TERRELL, BROWN and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur., BUFORD, C. J., THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent., BUFORD, and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
153 Fla. 458 Florida Supreme Court (1943) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 14 So. 2d 845
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a judgment in an automobile collision case, finding that the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions. The court held that the plaintiff is not required to disprove contributory negligence and that the judge cannot charge the jury on the facts of the case.


Holding

Yes, the trial court erred. The plaintiff is not required to disprove contributory negligence, and the judge cannot charge the jury on the facts of the case.


Key Quotes

“The latter charge quoted was an erroneous statement of law. The plaintiff is not required to disprove contributory negligence.”

Establishes that the plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving their own lack of negligence.

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Facts & Procedural History

This case involves an automobile collision. The plaintiffs, Minnie M. Schwartz and her husband, sued Joseph L. Priest for damages. The defendants plea…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
ADAMS, J.:

ADAMS, J.:

This is an ordinary automobile collision case. The issue was- made by pleas of not guilty and contributory negligence filed to plaintiff’s declaration. .The judgment must be reversed for a new trial hence we limit our consideration to the only errors, shown in the record. r The court charged the jury at defendant’s request as follows:

“In determining whether Mrs, Schwartz contributed to the cause of the collision by her own negligence you may consider whether or not she suddenly turned left in front of the Priest truck.
“Before the injured party is entitled to recover damages she must prove not only that the other driver was guilty of negligence, but she must also prove that she, the injured party, was not guilty of any negligence whatsoever which contributed to the proximate cause of the collision; provided the Defendant was not grossly negligent.”

*459The latter charge quoted was an erroneous statement of law. The plaintiff is not required to disprove contributory negligence. Alachua Lake Corporation v. Jacobs, 151 Fla. 309, 9 So. (2nd) 631.

The first quoted charge is contrary to Section 54.17, Fla. Stat. 1941, which prohibits a charge on the facts. The charge must be confined to the law of the case insofar as the proof may tend to support the pleadings and no comment may be made by the trial judge on the facts which may or may not be proved.

The judgment is reversed for a new trial.

Reversed.

TERRELL, BROWN and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

BUFORD, C. J., THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

THOMAS, J.,

dissenting:

I disagree because in my opinion the first charge quoted is not prejudicial and there is no argument in the brief with reference to the second quoted charge, hence any objection to it may be considered to have been abandoned.

BUFORD, and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Dissent
THOMAS, J.,

THOMAS, J.,

dissenting:

I disagree because in my opinion the first charge quoted is not prejudicial and there is no argument in the brief with reference to the second quoted charge, hence any objection to it may be considered to have been abandoned.

BUFORD, and SEBRING, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Hall v. Holland, 47 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1950)
    …nce would not require the defendant "to rip and tear his premises apart." This was reversible error. It was contrary to Section 54.17, Florida Statutes, same F.S.A., which prohibits a charge on the facts, see Schwartz et al. v. Priest, 153 Fla. 458, 14 So. 2d 845, and it also withdrew from the jury a question which was the very crux of plaintiff's case. As has been heretofore stated, the defendant proceeded to replace the upright posts with angle braces, on his own initiative and without the benefit of exper…
  • Allison v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 700 (Fla. 1947)
  • Smith v. Tampa Elec. Co., 46 Fla. Supp. 185 (Hillsborough Cty. Cir. Ct. 1977)
    …ff, then the burden was on the defendants to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which was also a proximate cause of his injuries. See: White v. Hughes, 190 So.446, Schwartz v. Priest, 14 So. 2d 845, and C. W. Zaring & Co. v. Dennis, 19 So. 2d 701. Under the evidence in this case, the jury, in the opinion of this court, could properly find that the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence proximately causing his injuries. If the accident oc…

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