YOUSKO
v.
VOGT ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this negligence case arising from a vehicular collision involving a skooter, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the doctrine of "last clear chance," holding that the doctrine is inapplicable when both parties' negligence is concurrent and neither had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident.
The trial judge did not err in refusing the "last clear chance" instruction because the evidence demonstrated that the negligence of both parties was concurrent and neither had the last clear opportunity to avoid the accident, making the doctrine inapplicable.
“Although this requested charge is copied almost verbatim from our opinion in the case of Merchants Transportation Company v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401, 404, it was not a proper charge to be given in this case because the evidence shows that the negligence of each party litigant was concurrent.”
Establishes the primary holding that concurrent negligence precludes application of the "last clear chance" doctrine.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Yousko was operating a skooter when it collided with an automobile driven by Elberta Rosier at an intersection. Both parties had clear, unob…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Concurrent Negligence cases and more on FLexlaw
•HOBiSON, Chief Justice.
The only question presented by the appellant is whether the trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to charge the jury on the doctrine of “last clear chance.”
Our examination of the record in this case convinces us that .the learned Circuit Judge did not err in refusing to give charge No. 11 as requested by counsel for appellant. Although this requested charge is copied almost verbatim from our opinion in the case of Merchants Transportation Company v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401, 404, it was not a proper charge to be given in this case because the evidence shows that the negligence of each party litigant was concurrent. In such a situation the doctrine of “last clear chance” is not applicable. Merchants Transportation Co. v. Daniel, supra, and cases therein cited. In this case it is obvious that neither party had the last “clear opportunity of avoiding” the accident. Although each party had a clear, unobstructed view, neither saw the other until the instant before the appulse, at which time appellant admits he saw the automobile. Counsel for appellant contend that the driver of the car, had she been exercising reasonable care and looking where she was going with “seeing eyes”, would have seen their client in time to have avoided the accident. The fact remains, however, that the jury had a right to believe the testimony of Elberta Rosier, who was driving the automobile which collided with the skooter, when she definitely testified that she did not see Mr. Yousko “until he struck the corner of the car” although she “glanced” both ways before proceeding into the intersection. Her failure to see him was, at most, nothing meré than a continuation of her negligence. No point is raised on this appeal with reference to the question of the negligence of Elberta Rosier. The case apparently was determined by the jury upon the basis of contributory negligence of appellant which his request for a charge upon the doctrine of the “last clear chance” presupposes. Appellant did not merit the benefit of a charge upon the doctrine of “last clear chance”. Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 1 So. 2d 4751
A trial judge when faced with a request for a charge upon the doctrine of the “last clear chance” should be extremely cautious. Such a charge should never be given unless the evidence clearly demonstrates its applicabilty. If this be not true, the giving of such a charge would either work' an advantage to the plaintiff to which he would not be entitled or at least would tend to confuse, rather than aid, the jury in the performance of its duty.
It follows that our judgment should be and is one of affirmance.
Affirmed.
TERRELL, THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ-, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
-
Marlon A. James and Donald v. James, 133 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1961)…d in Falnes, that a charge on the doctrine of the last clear chance is not to be regarded as pro forma or merely a conventional instruction to be given in all automobile negligence cases. On the other hand, as we pointed out in Yousko v. Vogt, Fla., 63 So. 2d 193, the charge should not be given unless the evidence clearly demonstrates its applicability. This standard should be observed for the simple reason that in giving this charge to the jury the trial judge is, in effect isolating and pointing out in det…
-
Falnes v. Kaplan, 101 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1958)…ctions arising from the operation of automobiles. On occasions we have held that the trial court committed error in giving the charge, Ippolito v. Brenner, Fla., 72 So. 2d 802; that the court did not err in refusing the charge, Yousko v. Vogt, Fla., 63 So. 2d 193; and that the court erred in rejecting the charge, Miller v. Ungar, 149 Fla. 79, 5 So. 2d 598. We have also held that such a charge should not be given “unless the evidence clearly ■demonstrates its applicability.” Yousko v. Vogt, supra [63 So. 2d 1…
-
Wawner v. Sellic Stone Studio, 74 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954)…sonably to avert the accident, otherwise the doctrine does not apply. This latter situation is typical in the cases cited by appellee in support of his position. These cases are: Becker v. Blum, 142 Fla. 60, 194 So. 275; Yousko v. Vogt, Fla., 1953, 63 So. 2d 193; Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co., 147 Fla. 320, 2 So. 2d 586; Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 1 So. 2d 475; Miami Transit Company v. Goff, Fla., 1953, 66 So. 2d 487. None is similar to the case at Bar. In Becker v. Blum, supra [194 So. 276], a traffic lig…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Merchs. Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496 (Fla. 1933)
- Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471 (Fla. 1941)