SMITH
v.
MAYO
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John S. Smith challenged his life sentence imposed under Florida's Habitual Criminal Statute, arguing that the state improperly charged him with four felonies when two 1938 convictions count as one conviction under the statute. The Florida Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief, finding the habitual criminal charge void because Smith had only three qualifying convictions, not four.
The court held that the information charging violation of the Habitual Criminal Statute was improper and void because the two felony convictions on September 12, 1938, constitute only one conviction for purposes of the statute. With only three qualifying convictions rather than the required four, the habitual criminal charge cannot stand.
“We conclude that the information charging violation of the Habitual Criminal Statute was improper and void since the two felony convictions on September 12, 1938, are considered one for the purposes of the statute here involved.”
The core holding that the habitual criminal charge was void because multiple convictions on the same date count as one conviction under the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was sentenced to life imprisonment on October 5, 1943, by the Criminal Court of Record for Polk County under the Habitual Criminal Statute based…
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PER CURIAM.
The petitioner, John S. Smith, filed his letter dated January 17, 1953, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court, questioning the legality of the life sentence imposed by the Criminal Court of Record for Polk County, Florida, on October 5, 1943. The information charged that petitioner had been convicted of four felonies and was therefore a violator of the Habitual Criminal Statute, Section 775.10, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. The letter-petition was then referred to the Attorney General of the State of Florida, who, having investigated, reported that two of said four sentences were entered September 12, 1938, one on April 12, 1943, and the fourth on August 13, 1943.
We conclude that the information charging violation of the Habitual Criminal Statute was improper and void since the two felony convictions on September 12, 1938, are considered one for the purposes of the statute here involved. Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So. 2d 304. It is clear then that for present purposes the petitioner has but three convictions.
The writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted to the prisoner Smith and the report of the Attorney General is treated as return thereto. It is also ordered that petitioner be taken before the Criminal Court of Polk County for the imposition of legal sentence for the commission of the crime of “Grand Larceny,” the alleged fourth felony for which the life sentence had been meted out. See Camp v. State, 92 Fla. 185, 109 So. 445; Coleman v. State, 140 Fla. 772, 193 So. 84, and Reed v. Mayo, 61 So. 2d 757.
HOBSON, C. J., and ROBERTS, MATHEWS and DREW, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806 (Fla. 1947)
- Coleman v. State ex rel. Costello Jackson, 140 Fla. 772 (Fla. 1939)
- In re Camp, 92 Fla. 185 (Fla. 1926)