JOE GLOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Police reports are not subject to automatic public disclosure and require a showing of relevance or exculpatory value for defense access.
[1] Police reports are not subject to public inspection as a matter of public policy, as some public records must be kept confidential.
[2] The right of inspection of public records does not extend to all documents, as public policy requires certain records to be treated as confidential.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant subpoenaed police reports related to his criminal charges. The custodian refused to produce them on advice of the state attorney. The trial …
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
Appellant, Joe Glow, was charged in a two-count information with (1) robbery, and (2) using a firearm in the commission of a felony. He issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring the sheriff, or his authorized custodian, to appear, give oral deposition and produce any and all police reports made in connection with the investigation of the charges. The custodian appeared and was willing to disclose the reports ; but, upon advice of the assistant state attorney, did not do so.
Appellant then filed a motion seeking to compel disclosure of the reports and a motion for order to show cause for failure to comply with the subpoena duces tecum. At a hearing the motion to compel was granted, conditioned on the state’s right to apply for an in camera inspection if the reports contained sensitive, or otherwise privileged matters. The motion for a show cause order was denied on the ground that the custodian had appeared to disclose the reports and only refused on instructions from the state.
The state moved for an in camera inspection, on the basis of the judicially recognized concept of confidentiality of police reports. At the same time the state agreed to supply those portions of the reports which constituted substantially verbatim statements of witnesses for the state. Subsequently, a hearing was held on the state’s motion for an in camera inspection and the court entered its order requiring the police reports to be made available to appellant only upon a showing that they were relevant or critical to his defense, or that they tend to exculpate him. Defense counsel announced to the court that he could not make such a showing. Appellant then changed his plea to nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the court’s ruling, and stipulated that the state could prove a prima facie case. This appeal ensued.
Appellant has raised several points for our consideration which have been consolidated into two arguments. The first is whether police reports constitute public records under Florida Statutes, Section 119.01.
Appellant relies on the case of Williams v. State, Fla.1973, 285 So. 2d 13, and contends that the Supreme Court held police reports to be public records; and, therefore, appellant submits, would be available to public inspection. However, we are unable to adopt appellant’s broad interpretation of the holding in Williams, supra. The document referred to as a public record in that case was not a police report, as such, but a statement of the victim which had been given to the police.
This court in a recent opinion in the case of Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co., Fla.App.2d, 1975, 310 So. 2d 345, held:
It has always been held that right of inspection does not extend to all public records or documents, because public policy requires that some of them be treated as confidential. See 66 Am.Jur.2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 27. In Lee v. Beach Pub. Co., 1937, 127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440, our Supreme Court said:
“The appellant contends that there are certain records in the police department of a city which must be kept secret and free from common inspection as a matter of public policy. This is true. The rule as stated in 23 R.C. L. 161, is as follows:
‘The right of inspection does not extend to all public records or documents, for public policy demands that some of them, although of a public nature, must be kept secret and free from common inspection, such for example as diplomatic correspondence and letters and despatches (sic) in the detective police service or otherwise relating to the apprehension and prosecution of criminals.’ ”
The Supreme Court of Florida also recognized in State v. Johnson, Fla.1973, 284 So. 2d 198, that police reports would not be made readily available to the public when it found:
We must also bear in mind that police reports and documents often include leads to other cases and other suspects. This information must be protected in order to afford fair pursuit of such involvement by others and the solution of other offenses. These important objectives can be destroyed or defeated if police reports are made so readily available; the police would understandably be hesitant to enter freely in reports what might be of help later on if they were not generally protected.
If police reports are held to be public records, there would be nothing to prevent the local representatives of the Mafia from making weekly visits to the police station in order to stay abreast of current efforts being made to investigate and thwart crime. Due to the great public interest in protecting and safeguarding the confidentiality of the police reports, the trial court was correct in holding-that such reports were not open to public inspection.
Insofar as the appellant claims that he was entitled to the police report on a theory of pretrial discovery, we think this contention is adequately disposed of by our opinion in State v. Gillespie, Fla.App.2d 1969, 227 So. 2d 550. The prosecution is obliged to supply the appellant with any exculpatory or favorable evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 1963, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, but in the absence of facts or circumstances from which it may be inferred that such evidence is likely to exist, the court is not required to conduct an in camera inspection for the purpose of determining whether any portion of the police report should be made available to the appellant. Cf. State v. Johnson, supra.
Affirmed.
McNULTY, C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
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The Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 438 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…ure. Id. The exemption has always had a limited purpose — to prevent premature disclosure of information when such disclosure could impede an ongoing investigation or allow a suspect to avoid apprehension or escape detection. Id.; see Glow v. State, 319 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Materials in the officers’ personnel files prior to the incident investigated have no relation to that purpose. Cannella based his exemption claim on the rationale that by subpoenaing the personnel records, he “complied” them wi…
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Miller v. State, 360 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…ncident made a written statement regarding the incident. At trial Officers Lightfield and Sullivan testified that they had previously reviewed their police reports. The state contends that on the authority of this court’s decision in Glow v. State, 319 So. 2d 47 (1975) we should affirm the trial court’s ruling. In Glow we held that police reports are not public documents open to inspection. However, our decision in Glow should not be read as placing a written statement of an eyewitness or victim to an alleg…
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City OF Tampa v. Harold, 352 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…do not constitute work product.6 In view whereof, we issue our writ of certiorari, reverse the order herein under review and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. SCHEB, Acting C. J., and OTT, J., concur. . See Glow v. State, 319 So. 2d 47 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). . See Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So. 2d 95 (Fla.2d DCA 1964). . Cf. Glow v. State, supra, n. 1. . 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla.1973). . Id. at 201. . See Nationwide Insurance Company v. Monroe, 276 So. 2d 547 (Fla.2d DCA 1973), cert.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963)
- State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Williams v. State, 285 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973)
- Lee v. Beach Publ'g Co., 127 Fla. 600 (Fla. 1937)
- Lavon Wisher v. News-Press Publ'g Co., 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)