JOHN PARISE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
John Parise was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit felony trespass and trespass. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial judge's statement to the jury that "a conspiracy had been proven" constituted highly prejudicial comment that deprived appellant of a fair trial in violation of established Florida law.
The trial judge's statement that "a conspiracy had been proven" was highly prejudicial and deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial, in violation of firmly established Florida law prohibiting judges from making remarks capable of conveying intimation of the judge's views on the weight or credibility of evidence.
[1] A trial judge's remarks to the jury should not convey any intimation as to the judge's view of the case or opinion on the weight, character, or credibility of the evidenc…
[2] A trial judge's statement to the jury that a conspiracy had been proven, after declaring a mistrial for codefendants, is considered highly prejudicial and deprives a defe…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, the Court has ruled that a conspiracy had been proven, and not really in that sense for you to decide, but only in a sense that evidence now will be, admissible evidence that has been admitted, that I had originally told you was to be applied to any of the defendants, each of the defendants, can be applied to all of the defendants.”
The trial judge's improper statement to the jury, which the court found to be highly prejudicial comment on a contested factual issue.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParise was tried alongside codefendants Green and Duffield for conspiracy to commit felony trespass and trespass. During trial, the court declared a m…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prejudicial Remarks cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, defendant in the trial court, appeals his conviction following a jury trial for (1) conspiracy to commit a felony by trespassing upon land, and (2) trespass.
We first considered appellant’s contention on appeal that the information was not sufficiently definite and have determined this point is without merit. See State v. Smith, Fla.1970, 240 So. 2d 807 and Machin v. State, Fla.App.1972, 270 So. 2d 464.
We next turned our attention to the second point on appeal with respect to the alleged improper remarks of the trial judge to the jury.
This issue arrises from the following remark to the jury by the judge immediately after the court declared a mistrial as to the codefendants of the appellant:
“THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Court has—for reasons that do not have to be explained to you—has granted a mistrial on the defendants, Green and Duffield, and this case will proceed as to Mr. Parise.
“Do not infer guilt solely from the fact that the trial is continuing with regard to Mr. Parise, and not to Mr. Duf-field and Mr. Green. They will be tried at another time, retried.
“However, the Court has ruled that a conspiracy had been proven, and not really in that sense for you to decide, but only in a sense that evidence now will be, admissible evidence that has been admitted, that I had originally told you was to be applied to any of the defendants, each of the defendants, can be applied to all of the defendants.” [Emphasis Supplied]
* * * * * *
The firmly established rule in Florida is that the trial judge should avoid making directly to or within the hearing of the jury any remark which is capable directly or indirectly, expressly, inferentially or by innuendo of conveying any intimation as to what view he (or she) takes of the case or as to what opinion the judge holds as to the weight, character or credibility of any evidence adduced. Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933); Seward v. State, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 529; Raulerson v. State, Fla.1958, 102 So. 2d 281.
We agree with the appellant that the above remark “that a conspiracy had been proven,” being highly prejudicial, deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial. Thus, we reverse for a new trial.
In light of our disposition of this point on appeal, it is not necessary to determine appellant’s remaining contentions.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447 (Fla. 1933)
- State v. Smith, 240 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1970)
- Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1958)
- Seward v. State, 59 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952)
- MacHin v. State, 270 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)