JOSEPH SEGAL, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM A. GARRIGUES, III, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, considered whether an order granting a motion to dismiss a slander count "with prejudice" is a final appealable order. The court held that such orders are final and appealable when the dismissed count constitutes a distinct and separate cause of action not interdependent with remaining counts.
An order dismissing a count "with prejudice" is a final and appealable order when that count constitutes a distinct and separate cause of action not interdependent with the remaining counts. Here, the slander count was distinct from the business interference counts and therefore the dismissal order was appealable.
[1] An order dismissing a count of a complaint "with prejudice" is a final and appealable order.
[2] The addition of the words "with prejudice" to an order dismissing a complaint indicates finality for appeal purposes.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint "with prejudice" is not a final order; that the words "with prejudice" added nothing to the effect of the order”
The prior Raphael holding that was effectively overruled by subsequent Florida Supreme Court precedent
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Segal sued appellee Garrigues in three counts: Count I for slander based on alleged public remarks by Garrigues; Count II for interference w…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Interference With Contract Rights cases and more on FLexlaw
DOWNEY, Judge.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
Appellant Segal sued appellee Garrigues in three counts. Count I is for slander; count II is for interference with contractual rights in the operation of appellant’s business; count IV is for conspiracy to destroy appellant’s business and good will; count III has been abandoned. Upon motion to dismiss, the trial court granted the motion as to count I “with prejudice” and as to counts II and IV “with leave to amend.” Appellee has moved to dismiss appellant’s plenary appeal from the dismissal of count I on the ground that said order is not a final appealable order, relying upon the decision of this court in Raphael v. Carner, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 298.
In the Raphael case this court held that an order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint “with prejudice” is not a final order; that the words “with prejudice” added nothing to the effect of the order. However, in Duncan v. Pullum, Fla.App.1967, 198 So. 2d 658, the Second District Court of Appeal held that striking a counterclaim “with prejudice” was a final appealable order. Only recently in Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., Fla.1974, 303 So. 2d 1, the Supreme Court of Florida approved the holding in Duncan v. Pullum, supra, thus for all intents and purposes overruling our holding in Raphael. Accordingly, it appears safe to conclude now that the addition of the words “with prejudice” indicates finality.
Since the order granting the motion to dismiss count I with prejudice is a final order, it is appealable even though other counts of the complaint remain pending if count I is a distinct and separate cause of action which is not interdependent with counts II and IV. Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., supra. As previously noted count I attempted to allege a cause of action for slander by virtue of remarks which appellee allegedly publicly made about appellant. Counts II and IV charge appellee with business interference. In our view count I is a distinct and separate cause of action and is not interdependent with the other two counts. Consequently, the order appealed from is a final appealable order within the rule of Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., supra.
Accordingly, appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.
OWEN, C. T., and WALDEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Mitchell v. Italian-American Club, 122 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). We reject Gries’ contention that the addition of the words “with prejudice” makes the order final. In so doing, we do not overlook Segal v. Garrigues, 320 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), which in no uncertain terms states that an order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice is final for appeal purposes. Segal overruled Raphael v. Carner, 194 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), which, in our view, correctly held…
-
Russell v. Russell, 507 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…ot an appeal from a non-final order per Rule 9.130, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is dismissed upon authority of Board of County Commissioners of Madison Co. v. Grice, 438 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1983). We recede from Segal v. Garrigues, 320 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DGA 1975), because of the holding in Grice, which holding relied upon Gries Investment Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), which rejected Segal. The appeal is DISMISSED. DOWNEY, LETTS, DELL, WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concu…
-
Robert E. Lawler, M.D. v. Harris, 418 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…for purposes of appeal has been considered by two other District Courts of Appeal, with conflicting results. The Fourth District has held it to be a final, appealable order. Cordani v. Roulis, 395 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Segal v. Garrigues, 320 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). The Third District, in an opinion by Judge Pearson, has held that an order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice is neither a judgment nor a final dismissal, the words “with prejudice” actually adding nothing of legal cons…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mendez v. W. Flagler Fam. Ass'n, Inc., 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974)
- Duncan v. Pullum, 198 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Raphael v. Carner, 194 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)