FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, APPELLANT,
v.
W. O. NORVILLE ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida's Department of Revenue lacks sovereign immunity for a cross-claim alleging slander of title to property sold at a sheriff's sale for delinquent sales tax, because the conduct occurred after Fla. Stat. § 768.28 waived sovereign immunity for the executive branch's tort liability.
The State of Florida's sovereign immunity was waived by Fla. Stat. § 768.28 for tort claims arising from executive branch conduct occurring after the statute's effective date.
[1] Fla. …
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Revenue was named as a defendant in a suit to cancel a Sheriff's Deed to real property in Palm Beach County, allegedly sold for deli…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Executive Branch cases and more on FLexlaw
OWEN, Judge.
The State of Florida, Department of Revenue, a part of the executive branch of the government, was named as a defendant in a suit to cancel a Sheriff’s Deed to certain real property in Palm Beach County, the property having been ostensibly sold at a Sheriff’s sale for allegedly delinquent state sales tax. Other defendants included the purchaser of the property, who filed a cross-claim against the Department of Revenue alleging that the cross-defendant had slandered the title to the property. The State’s motion to dismiss the cross-claim on the grounds of sovereign immunity was denied and the State brings this interlocutory appeal from that order. Appellant’s sole contention here is that the State had sovereign immunity and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. See, Kirk v. Kennedy, 231 So. 2d 246 (Fla.App. 2nd 1970). If the cross-claimant has a cause of action, an issue which we do not decide, it arose out of conduct of the State occurring on or about September 13, 1974. This was subsequent to the date that Fla.Stat. § 768.28 (Supp. 1974), which waived the State’s sovereign immunity for tort liability, became effective as to the executive branch of government. Thus, the issue before us must be decided adversely to appellant’s contention.
Affirmed.
WALDEN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Rumbough v. City OF Tampa, 403 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…gence. Weston v. State, 373 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Cobb’s Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coleman, 353 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State ex rel. Division of Admin. v. Oliff, 350 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Florida Dep’t. of Revenue v. Norville, 321 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). . But see Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972), which construed language in the Federal Tort Claims Act similar to that in section 768.28 to exclude damages caused by the nonnegligent ultrahazardou…
Authorities Cited
- Kirk v. Kennedy, 231 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)