HAMILTON CONST. CO.
v.
BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY

Fla. | 1953-04-07
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
65 So. 2d 729 Florida Supreme Court (1953) Positive Treatment
Cited by 59 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Hamilton Construction Company contracted to build school buildings for the Dade County Board of Public Instruction. A contract clause provided that the contractor would be reimbursed for carpenter wages exceeding $2.06¼ per hour if paid at a 'prevailing wage scale' agreed upon by carpenters and contractors. The court held that since no such agreement was reached, the contractor was bound by the base rate and not entitled to reimbursement for excess wages paid.


Holding

The court held that the contract language was unambiguous and that 'prevailing wage scale' was defined in the contract as a wage scale agreed upon by carpenters and contractors. Since no such agreement was reached, the contractor was bound by the $2.06¼ per hour rate specified in the contract and was not entitled to reimbursement for excess wages paid.


Key Quotes

“We hold that the words "prevailing wage scale" used in the contract are defined by the following sentence in the contract to be a "wage scale that has been agreed upon by the carpenters and the floor layers on the one hand and the various contractors and Builders Associations on the other hand."”

The court's holding on the meaning of 'prevailing wage scale' and the basis for denying reimbursement

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

On May 1, 1951, Hamilton Construction entered into a contract with the Board of Public Instruction to construct two school buildings. Due to pending l…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DREW, Justice.

DREW, Justice.

On May 1, 1951, Hamilton Construction Co., hereafter called the contractor, entered into a written agreement with the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida, hereafter called the owner, to construct two school buildings. At the time this contract was entered into the litigation which resulted in the opinion of this Court in the case of Carpenters’ District Council, etc. v. Miami Chapter of Associated General Contractors, etc., 55 So. 2d 794, was pending. The contract provided the minimum wage scale of all employees under the contract except carpenters and floor layers. Because of the uncertainty of the wage scale of these craftsmen created by the action of the Local Council and the resulting litigation above described, a special clause was inserted in the contract reading as follows:

“Art. A — 49 Schedule of Minimum Wages

“(a) Recommended by the Construction Industry Council of Dade County, 1113 Congress Building, Miami, Florida.

“(b) There shall be paid each employee engaged in work under this Contract at the site of the project in the trade or occupation listed on attached sheet, not less than the wage rate set opposite the same. (Refer to the Wage Scale Sheet attached to these General Conditions.)

“Official Construction Wage Rates-Dade County, Florida. - -

“In Force Until Midnight March 31, ' 1951' •"

“Carpenters (Foremen-add 12or 25^ per hour — see Trade Rules 2.061/&’'

“The following addition shall be made to the section entitled ‘Official Construction Wage Rates Dade County, Florida’.

“This wage scale shall be effective as of January 1, 1951, with the exception of the classifications of Carpenters and Floor Layers.

“Since no decision has reached this office as of this date, the wages paid to Carpenters and Floor Layers will be handled in the following manner:

“ ‘The wage scale referred to does not include wage scale for Carpenters and Floor Layers; the wage scale of $2.06J4 per hour and $2.10 per hour respectively for these trades is to be used. The Contract will provide for the payment by the Owner to the Contractor of any wages paid to Carpenters and Floor Layers at a rate in excess of $2.0614 per hour and $2.10 per hour respectively, provided that the amount so paid in excess of $2.0<7{4 $2.10 per hour, respectively, is paid on a prevailing wage scale at the time so paid. That is to say, a wage scale that has been agreed upon by the Carpenters and the Floor Layers on one hand, and the various Contractors and Builders Associations on the other hand, and provided further that the Owner shall be furnished proof satisfactory to it of the payment of any increased wages, which proof shall consist of time not necessarily limited to signed payroll sheets, the privilege of inspecting the original and copies of Federal and State Unemployment Tax Refunds and original and copies of Federal Social Security Tax Returns; and provided further that the additional sum of money, if any, can be paid to the contractor by the Owner by reason of increased wages paid to Carpenters and Floor Layers shall be paid after the building is finally completed and the Owner has had sufficient time and information to check the proof furnished it by the Contractor with respect to the increased pay- merits provided hereunder.’ ” (Emphasis supplied)

In order to complete its contract, the •contractor entered into an agreement with the Carpenters’ Union to pay the carpenters, and did pay the carpenters on the job, $2.50 per hour, which scale it is admitted, was the scale paid by a majority of the general contractors of Dade County at the time, but was not the scale fixed by the Construction Industry Council. It is admitted that the contractor had paid to the carpenters on the two jobs a total of $13,594.34 in excess payments over the rate of $2.06j4 per hour. The contractors contend: (1) that it was the intent of the parties to the contract to reimburse the contractor for wages paid in excess of a certain sum provided that the excess amount so paid was paid at the prevailing scale; (2) that the scale agreed to was a formula and not a delegation of power; (3) that since it was only a formula, if the scale could be ascertained otherwise it was unnecessary to resort to the formula; and (4) that the reference In the contract to an agreement by the carpenters and the various contractors fixing a wage scale is void because it is meaningless and uncertain. The owner contends that the parties knew of the dispute respecting carpenters’ wages and that to definitely fix the rights of the parties they agreed that the minimum hourly rate for carpenters would be $2.06^ and that the excess paid, if any, would be the difference between that figure and whatever figure was fixed “by the carpenters * * * on one hand and the various contractors on the other hand,” and that in using said language both parties had in mind that the words “prevailing wage” was that wage which would be fixed by the Construction Industry Council as had been done since 1948.

The lower court, in dismissing the contractors’ complaint with prejudice, affirmed the position of the owner and, we think correctly.

We think the language of the contract which we have quoted and emphasized is unambiguous. We hold that the words “prevailing wage scale” used in the contract are defined by the following sentence in the contract to be a • “wage scale that has been agreed upon by the carpenters and the floor layers on the one hand and the various contractors and Builders Associations on the other hand.” No such scale having been agreed upon, the contractor is bound by the amount of $2.06:>4 per hour fixed in the contract.

The parties selected the language of the contract. Finding it to be clear and unambiguous, We have no right — nor did the lower court — to give it a meaning other than that expressed in it. To hold otherwise would be to do violence to the most fundamental principle of contracts. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 296, p. 695. The parties simply agreed that if the Construction Industry Council fixed a wage scale for carpenters in excess of $2.06;¡4 per hour during the construction period and the contractor paid such scale, the owner would reimburse it for the difference. -All other scales fixed by the Council were a part of the contract and it appears to be a perfectly natural thing to us that the same rule be used to measure the carpenters’ wage scale.

For'the reasons herein set forth the decree of the lower court is affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (31 total)

  • …biguous, we have no right — nor did the lower court — to give it a meaning other than that expressed in it. To hold otherwise would be to do violence to the most fundamental principle of contracts.” Hamilton Constr. Co. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 65 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla.1953). We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s orders and, in light of our holding and the parties’ stipulation at trial, direct that on remand it enter judgment for the appellants. Reversed and remanded with directions. DANAHY, A.C.J.…
  • Paddock v. BAY Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
    …. Jacobs v. Parodi, 1905, 50 Fla. 541, 39 So. 833. Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court can give to it no meaning other than that expressed. Hamilton Const. Co. v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Fla.1953, 65 So. 2d 729. It is not within the power of a court to make a contract for the parties, and an unambiguous agreement must be enforced in accordance with its terms. Bryant v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. Niagara Chem. Div., Fla.App.1961, 130 So. 2d 132. Usually, the…
  • Hunt v. First Nat'l Bank OF Tampa, 381 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
    …extrinsic evidence bearing upon the intent of the parties and thus precluding summary judgment. If a contract is- clear, complete and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction. Hamilton Construction Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, 65 So. 2d 729 (Fla.1953). But even the most cautious drafting, and the most exhaustive imagination, rarely covers every possible contingency. If a contract fails to specify the rights or duties of the parties under certain conditions or in certain situations, the…

Previewing 3 of 31 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw