E. C. LINGER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
R. C. BALFOUR, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1931-07-28
Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur., Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
102 Fla. 591 Florida Supreme Court (1931) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 136 So. 433
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a nonresident defendant may be sued on a transitory action in any county of Florida where the court obtains jurisdiction over the person, as no statutory privilege limits venue for nonresidents on causes of action arising outside the state.


Holding

A nonresident defendant may be sued on a transitory action in any county of Florida where the court has jurisdiction of the person, as the common law rule applies and there is no statutory privilege limiting venue for nonresidents on causes of action arising outside the state.


Key Quotes

“At common law, the venue of a transitory action could be laid in any county where the court, could get jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.”

Establishes the foundational common law principle governing venue for transitory actions

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Facts & Procedural History

Linger brought suit against nonresident defendant Balfour on a transitory action. The lower court ruled on a matter of venue relating to where the sui…

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Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

— At common law, the venue of a transitory action could be laid in any county where the court, could get jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The defendant had no “privilege” of being sued at any particular place. However, as service could not be had on a defendant outside the county where it was issued, the plain*592tiff necessarily had to bring his suit in the county where he could serve the defendant.

Our statute Section 4234, O. O. L. provides that all process shall run throughout the State, and therefore process may be issued in one county and served in any other county in the State.

Going on the common law theory that a transitory action could be brought in any county so long as the court got jurisdiction of the person, a suit on a transitory action may now be brought in any county and service had in any other county, except for other provisions of our statutes limiting the places where suits may be brought, or giving the defendant the privilege of being sued in a particular county.

These privileges are creatures of statute and not of the common law.

Our statutes are a limitation upon the common law, rather than an enlargement of it. Section 4219 C. G. L., by its very language indicates this, for'it says, “Suits shall only be begun” etc. There is no statutory privilege provided for the nonresident to be used- on a cause of action arising out of the State at a particular place in this State. Therefore, the common law rule must apply to him, and he may be sued anywhere on a transitory action so long as the court has jurisdiction of his person.

T’he ruling of the court below on this- writ of error was contrary to the foregoing principles and therefore the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.

Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …action was' transitory where the 'transaction on which it was founded might have taken place anywhere and was considered local where the transaction could only have happened or been consummated in the place where it was made. Linger v. Balfour, Fla. 136 So. 433; 1 C. J., pages 931-933; 27 R. C. L. 786-787. Generally transactions arising out of contract are class'ed as transitory and the common law held such actions transitory regardless of the place where the contract was executed and to be performed. 27 R…
  • Krivitsky v. NYE, 155 Fla. 45 (Fla. 1944)
    …. (2nd) 576. As to the defendant, American Surety Company, on the record as it now exists, we cannot hold that the suit against it was improperly brought in Hillsborough County, Florida. See Section 648.07, Fla. Stats. 1941 (FSA); Linger v. Balfour, 102 Fla. 591, 136 So. 443; Patten v. Mokher, 134 Fla. 433, 184 So. 29. The order or decree appealed from is reversed with directions to the lower court to enter an order overruling the motion to dismiss as interposed by the defendants, and for further proceedin…
  • Abbate v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 631 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis added). Under Florida law, all process of all courts run throughout the state. § 48.011, Fla.Stat. Thus, process can be issued in one county and served in any other county in the state. Linger v. Balfour, 102 Fla. 591, 136 So. 433 (1931).1 The defendant concedes the sheriff of Palm Beach County or his designee or even an elisor could have served him in Palm Beach County, but claims that a certified process server appointed by the chief judge of the Palm Beach Cir…

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