GLENN M. SURRATT, APPELLANT,
v.
CLAUDE L. FLEMING AND PRISCILLA FLEMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS)
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's vacation of a judicial sale, holding that mere inadequacy of price alone cannot set aside a judicial sale without additional circumstances supporting unjust enrichment.
Mere inadequacy of the price bid and paid is insufficient to set aside a judicial sale unless coupled with other circumstances tending to cause the inadequacy.
[1] Inadequacy of price alone is insufficient to vacate a judicial sale; other circumstances tending to cause the inadequacy must be present.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mere inadequacy of the price bid and paid is not sufficient to set aside a judicial sale, unless coupled with other circumstances having a tendency to cause the inadequacy.”
Court stating the governing legal standard for setting aside judicial sales based on price inadequacy.
Appellant Surratt purchased defendants' property at a judicial sale, paying a price the trial court deemed inadequate. The trial court subsequently va…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Inadequacy Of Price cases and more on FLexlaw
MILLS, Judge.
We temporarily relinquished jurisdiction of this case to the trial court for the entry of an order nunc pro tunc setting forth the facts upon which the trial court granted defendants’ motion to vacate and set aside a judicial sale of defendants’ property to appellant. Surratt v. Fleming, 309 So. 2d 614 (Fla.App. 1st, 1975). The trial court entered the requested order, however, the facts recited by the trial court had been resolved adversely to defendant by a previous order; therefore, there was no record to support the trial court’s findings of fact.
The trial court’s nunc pro tunc order recited that the sale was being set aside because the price bid and paid by appellant was such a small amount that it amounted to unjust enrichment.
Mere inadequacy of the price bid and paid is not sufficient to set aside a judicial sale, unless coupled with other circumstances having a tendency to cause the inadequacy. Maule Industries v. Seminole Rock and Sand Company, 91 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1957). The record before us contains no facts or circumstances which would support the trial court’s view.
Accordingly, the order vacating and setting aside the sale of 28 June 1972 and the certificate of title issued to appellant Sur-ratt on 10 July 1972 is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court to reinstate the certificate of sale and certificate of title.
BOYER, C. J., concurs specially.
McCORD, J., dissents.
BOYER, Chief Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in reversal.
McCORD, Judge
(dissenting).
In consideration of the findings of the trial judge, I do not consider that it was an abuse of discretion to vacate and set aside the judicial sale. I would require, however, as additional conditions (to those imposed by the trial judge) that appellees pay appellant interest on the purchase price paid by him and his reasonable attorney’s fee for this appeal.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Munger v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 563 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…PER CURIAM. We find that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to set aside the mortgage foreclosure sale. See Maule Industries, Inc. v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 91 So. 2d 307 (Fla.1956); Surratt v. Fleming, 322 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 600 (Fla.1976); Rosen v. Hunter, 224 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Because it is not ripe for judicial review, ■ we do not address the attorney’s fee issue raised in appellee’s cross appeal. See City…
-
Schwartz v. Peterson, 46 Fla. Supp. 97 (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. 1977)…the defendants shall reimburse the third party purchaser, John Crescent, Inc., in the sum of $750, for attorney’s fees expended in this cause. Quinn Plumbing Co. v. New Miami Shores Corporation, 129 So. 690, 692 (Fla. 1930), and Surratt v. Fleming, 322 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975) (McCord, J., dissenting). It is further ordered and adjudged that jurisdiction of this action is retained to enter further orders as are deemed appropriate and just.…
Authorities Cited
- Maule Indus., Inc. v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 91 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956)
- Surratt v. Fleming, 309 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)