ROSENFELDER ET AL.
v.
HUTTOE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order granting a new trial in an attorney's fee dispute, holding that the jury's verdict of $2,500 was supported by competent evidence and that the trial court improperly invaded the jury's province by setting it aside.
The trial court improperly invaded the jury's province by setting aside the verdict. The verdict of $2,500 was supported by competent evidence from qualified witnesses and should not have been disturbed merely to allow another jury to pass on the question.
“It is a simple invasion of the basic province of the jury for the court, under the circumstances shown by the record, to set aside the verdict rendered.”
Establishes the core holding that trial courts cannot overturn jury verdicts on attorney's fees when competent evidence supports them
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing the Florida Supreme Court's reversal in City of Miami v. Huttoe directing a jury trial on reasonable attorney's fees, the lower court heard …
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DREW, Justice.
In City of Miami v. Huttoe, Fla., 40 So. 2d 899, 901, we reversed a judgment entered by the trial court awarding attorney’s fees to Huttoe, appellee, for the reasons, as stated in the opinion (text page 901), “we think appellant was entitled to have the case submitted to a jury on this point alone to determine what amount under all the circumstances would be reasonable.” The opinion above concluded with these words:
“ * * * For this purpose and no other the cause is reversed with directions to submit the issue of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee under the circumstances recited and the issues made, the amount of the verdict so awarded will limit the amount that appellee may recover from appellant.”
At the trial in the lower court the attorneys representing the appellee testified as to the nature and extent of their services, and further testified what, in their opinion, would be a reasonable fee. One of the attorneys employed by appellee testified that a fee of $5,000 would be reasonable and the other that a fee of “substantially more than $7500.00” would be reasonable. A disinterested lawyer called by plaintiffs testified a fee of $10,000 would be reasonable. The appellants presented three lawyers, two of whom testified that $2,500 would be a reasonable fee and the other that $2,000 would be reasonable. On this evidence the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Huttoe for $2,500.
The lower court set this verdict aside and awarded a new trial, assigning as reasons therefor the following:
“(2) The verdict is contrary to the evidence.”
“(4) The verdict is so contrary to the law as to indicate misinterpretation and mistake on the part of the Jury.
“(5) The verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
“(6) The evidence of the defendant was insufficient both in quantity and quality for the Court to have submitted the same to the Jury for determination.”
“It is apparent to ,the Court that the jury totally failed to understand the elements to be taken into consideration for fixing the amount of attorney’s fees for services rendered by the attorney in prosecuting an appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.”
The City of Miami has appealed from this latter order. An examination of the record in this cause reveals that this cause was ably presented to the jury by skilled lawyers and that the jury had before it every element essential to the determination of' the narrow issue presented to it. There was ample, competent evidence in the record to support the verdict. Two qualified witnesses testified without objection from anybody that a reasonable fee was $2,500 and the jury believed them as they had every right to do. It is a simple invasion of the basic province of the jury for the court, under the circumstances shown by the record, to set aside the verdict rendered. The only reason for awarding a new trial would he to have one more jury pass on the question. This is not a sufficient reason. Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335; Motor Transit Co. v. Studstill, 129 Fla. 769, 176 So. 769, and many other cases.
The order granting a new trial is vacated and set aside with directions to enter a judgment on the verdict rendered.
Reversed.
ROBERTS, C. J., MATHEWS, J., and PARKS, Associate Justice, concur.
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Holland Paving Co., Inc. v. Dann, 169 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…pon the question of the amount of damages. No further evidence can be adduced by the plaintiff, nor does the record support the ground that the amount awarded was so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, Fla.1953, 66 So. 2d 226. The appeal of the plaintiff urges that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict as to the owner and lessee of the truck since these defendants failed to rebut the presumption of negligence arising by reason of the…
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MOW v. F. P. Sadowski Corp., 122 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…appellate court must necessarily rely upon the judgment of the trial court to see that unfettered justice is rendered. But the case was tried before the jury, as well as the judge. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, Fla.1953, 66 So. 2d 226, where the only reason for awarding a new trial would be to have another jury pass on the question of the amount of the damages, an order for a new trial upon the damages must be set aside. Reversed. HORTON, C. J., and CARROLL, CHAS., J., concur.…
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F. P. Sadowski Corp. v. MOW, 131 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1961)…ight have been unduly influenced by passion or prejudice. There is evidence of a great deal of pain and suffering, extended medical treatment and permanent injury.” And, further, “As the Supreme Court pointed out in Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, Fla. 1953, 66 So. 2d 226, where the only reason for awarding a new trial would be to have another jury pass on the question of the amount of the damages, an order for a new trial upon the damages must be set aside.” The order for a new trial on the question of damages was r…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183 (Fla. 1937)
- Motor Transit Co. v. Studstill, 129 Fla. 769 (Fla. 1937)
- City of Miami v. Huttoe, 40 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1949)