LEE HENRICH, APPELLANT,

v.

LYLE E. ANDERSON, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
  …180-day period constitutes a waiver. The court there noted in its opinion that there was an actual verbal acceptance of the trial date and not a mere failure to object or to point out that the date would be beyond the period. In Flournory v. State, 322 So. 2d 652 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), there was a hearing held on the next to the last day of the rule time period. At this hearing, the trial was continued and set for a date beyond the period. The district court held that since the record was silent as to any agreem…
• State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
  …the burden of compliance elsewhere than on the state. There being no waiver or other circumstances justifying extension, denial of the motion to discharge was error.” See also Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977); Flournory v. State, 322 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975); and Harris v. Tyson, 267 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). The requirements of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2)(i), requiring that an extension or waiver of the speedy trial time be in writing and be signed in proper person or by [*839]…
• State v. Kubesh, 378 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
  …r-cut as the situation in State v. Nelson, 320 So. 2d 835 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), where defense counsel orally accepted in open court a continuance beyond the 180-day period. On the other hand, it is not the situation that we faced in Flournory v. State, 322 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), where the record was completely silent as to any acceptance of a resetting of trial for a date beyond the speedy trial deadline.…