SALLY DUDLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND AND PARENT OF CLIFFORD JOHNSTON, A MINOR, APPELLANT,
v.
MAE'S DISCOUNT FABRICS, A DIVISION OF ABC FABRIC OF TAMPA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Sally Dudley, as mother and next friend of her minor son injured by a flammable fabric, appealed the dismissal of her negligence and breach of warranty claims against the retailer Mae's Discount Fabrics. The court held that a plaintiff need not be in privity with a retailer to sue for breach of implied warranty if the product is inherently dangerous, and reversed the premature dismissal to allow the case to proceed to trial.
A plaintiff need not be in privity with a retailer to recover for breach of implied warranty or negligence if the plaintiff can prove the product is inherently dangerous. The trial court's dismissal was premature, and the case must be remanded to allow the plaintiff to present evidence of whether the fabric was in fact a dangerous instrumentality.
[1] A plaintiff need not be in privity with a retailer to maintain an action against the retailer for breach of an implied warranty if the product is proven to be inherently…
[2] A complaint alleging negligence and breach of implied warranty against a retailer for selling an inherently dangerous product is sufficient to state a cause of action, ev…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that one need not be in privity with the retailer in order to have an action against him for breach of an implied warranty if the plaintiff can prove that the product in question is inherently dangerous.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that privity is not a bar to recovery when the product is inherently dangerous.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA minor child was severely injured when a fabric used as a kitchen drapery exploded and burst into flames while the child was attempting to put hot pa…
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HOBSON, Judge.
This appeal is from a final judgment dismissing the complaint of appellant. The complaint was in four counts against the appellee who is the retailer of the product which is alleged to be inherently dangerous. The first count alleges that the appellee was negligent in that it sold the inherently dangerous fabric while in a defective and dangerous condition. The second count realleges the same matter but in addition thereto alleges the appellee was negligent in failing to warn the appellant of the dangerous and defective characteristics of the product. This count states the derivative claim of the mother. The third count alleged a breach of implied warranty of fitness of the product and alleges it to be a dangerous instrumentality. The fourth count alleges the same matter but states the derivative claim of the mother. The allegedly dangerous product was a certain piece of fabric which was used as a kitchen drapery and that when the minor child was attempting to put some hot paraffin wax in the sink, the drapery exploded and burst into flames, severely injuring the minor. There is no question but what the injured minor was not in privity with the appellee. The ground upon which the trial court dismissed the complaint was stated by the court to be that it was not shown that the injured minor was in privity with the appellee.
All four counts of the complaint are based upon the premise that the fabric involved was in fact a dangerous instrumentality and that the appellant should prevail on both the breach of implied warranty and upon the negligence of the appellee even though appellant was not in privity with the appellee retailer. It is well settled that one need not be in privity with the retailer in order to have an action against him for breach of an implied warranty if the plaintiff can prove that the product in question is inherently dangerous. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Company, Fla.1968, 208 So. 2d 615; Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Department Stores, Inc., Fla.App.4th 1971, 256 So. 2d 248 and Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Department Stores, Inc., Fla.App.4th 1974, 291 So. 2d 58.
Although the complaint could have been more artfully drawn, it was at least adequate to state a cause of action for breach of implied warranty and for negligence on the part of the appellee. Keller, supra; Keller, supra.
At this stage of the case we must take all of the well-pled allegations of the complaint as being true and our holding herein is only based on the fact that the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint was premature. The appellant should have the opportunity to adduce evidence as to whether or not the material involved was in fact a dangerous instrumentality.
For the foregoing reasons the final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Toombs v. Fort Pierce GAS Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968)
- Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dep't Stores, Inc., 256 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Turner v. State, 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dep't Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)