STATE EX REL. FRONTON EXHIBITION CO.
v.
HAGGARD ET AL.
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A competing jai alai fronton owner sought a writ of mandamus to force the Florida Racing Commission to rescind a permit issued to a rival operator. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the new fronton violated the statutory 20-mile separation requirement, which must be measured by road travel via the most practical route rather than straight-line distance.
The petition for an alternative writ of mandamus was denied because the petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case. The petitioner must show that the distance between the two frons, measured by road travel via the most practical route as prescribed by statute, is less than 20 miles; mere straight-line distance measurements are insufficient.
“in no event shall any jai alai fronton be licensed to operate within twenty miles of a fronton already licensed”
States the statutory prohibition on proximity of jai alai frons that governs the Racing Commission's licensing decisions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFronton Exhibition Co. owns a jai alai fronton in Miami, Florida. Monro Operating Company, Inc. was constructing a competing fronton in Broward County…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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MATHEWS, Justice.
It appears from the petition that the relator owns a fronton in Miami, Florida. The respondents are members of the Florida Racing Commission and together constitute the Florida State Racing Commission, a state agency. The real party in interest appears to be Monro Operating Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, which corporation is in the process of constructing a racing fronton in Broward County, Florida, and a permit as provided for by the statute 550.05 F.S., F.S.A., and related statutes, was issued by the Florida State Racing Commission to Monro Operating Company, Inc., on the 11th day of July, 1953.
The purpose of this action is to coerce the Florida Racing Commission to take official action and rescind and cancel the permit heretofore issued by it.
The issuance of the alternative writ depends upon the construction to be placed upon Section 551.12, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, same F.S.A. The petition for alternative writ shows that the distance between the Miami fronton and the one in Broward County is 18% miles measured in a horizontal plane on a straight line from one location to the other. The petitioner does not allege that the distance between the two plants is less than 20 miles when measured by “road travel via most practical route”, Section 550.05, Florida Statutes. In the absence of such a showing, the petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case justifying the issuance of the alternative writ.
This is so because Section 551.12, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides, “All other pertinent provisions of chapter 550 of the Florida Statutes dealing with * * * the operators of dog racing tracks and dealing with the location thereof * * * not inconsistent with the express provisions of this chapter shall be construed to relate to and govern the state racing commission and the operators of any fronton and the location thereof * * *; provided, however, that in no event shall any jai alai fronton be licensed to operate within twenty miles of a fronton already licensed.” (The emphasis is supplied.) Chapter 550, and Section 550.05 thereof, which is a part of and must be construed in connection with Section 551.12, supra, prescribes the method of measurement of distances between dog tracks and also' frontons to be “miles road travel via most practical route of another location for which a permit has been issued and a racing plant located, except that permits heretofore issued and ratified by a majority of the voters of any county shall not be affected by this proviso.”
There is nothing before the court to show that the proposed plant is less than 20 miles from the existing plant when measured in the manner prescribed by Section 550.05, supra. Having failed to make a violation of the statute clearly to appear, the petition fails to show a prima facie right to the alternative writ, and the petition for same is hereby denied.
ROBERTS, C. J., and HOBSON and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
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State of Fla. on relation of Fla. JAI Alai, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 112 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1959)…One way of giving effect to the term “location thereof” which is not inconsistent with the express distance provisions of § 551.12 can be gleaned from an examination of the analogous case of State ex rel. Fronton Exhibition Co. v. Haggard, Fla.1953, 67 So. 2d 205.6 In the Haggard case we applied the road distance method of measuring distance set forth in § 550.05 to the distance limitation of § 551.12. Thus the term “location thereof” can be taken to mean that the method of measuring distance provided in Cha…1 / 2
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Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc. v. McKAY, 90 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956)…ulating dog racing [*340] in summer would also regulate frontons in summer. This court has frequently applied statutes involving dog racing to facts affecting jai alai or pelota frontons, as in State ex rel. Fronton Exhibition Co. v. Haggard, Fla., 67 So. 2d 205, dealing with required distances between frontons, and the Fronton, Inc., v. Florida State Racing Commission, Fla., 82 So. 2d 520, with reference.to establishment and operation of frontons. , Our conclusion is buttressed by the legislative as well…
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State v. Lechner, 191 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1966)…the Alternative Writ is denied, the return is held insufficient and the peremptory writ is awarded. It is so ordered. THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS and DREW, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs with opinion. . 144 Fla. 387, 198 So. 82 (1940). . Fla., 67 So. 2d 205 (1953).…