BOOTH
v.
BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY ET AL.
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Cora Alice Booth sued to quiet title to two parcels of Dade County property, claiming ownership through tax deeds from 1916 and 1918. The Board of Public Instruction of Dade County obtained summary judgment quieting title in itself, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition.
Summary final decree was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the property was improved and the applicability of the respective tax deeds. The court concluded it was too early to dispose of the other questions raised.
“Upon this state of the record, the conclusion that there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact" unde.r 31 F.S.A. Equity Rule 40(c) could not have been validly reached, and it is therefore too early to dispose of the other questions raised on this appeal.”
Establishes that summary judgment was improper because material factual disputes remained
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Booth claimed title to two parcels: Parcel A through a 1916 tax deed to Security Land Company, and Parcel B through a 1918 tax deed to Sun L…
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HOBSON, Justice.
On January 12, 1953, appellant, Cora Alice Booth, sued to quiet title to two described parcels of Dade County realty. In her verified complaint, she alleged that she deraigned her title to Parcel A of the property from a tax deed to.the Security Land Company dated May 1, 1916, and to Parcel B of the property from a tax deed to the Sun Land Company dated November 15, 1918, that she was in possession of the property, had paid the taxes, and had made improvements thereon.
Defendant-appellee Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida filed an answer in which it alleged, inter alia, that title to a large tract which included the property described as Parcel A had been vested in the Board of Public Instruction at the time of issuance of the tax deed and was not subject to taxation, and that the tax deed was therefore void. The answer also denied that Parcel A had been improved, but alleged that it was unimproved and wild land. With its answer, defendant-appellee filed a motion for summary final decree, asking that title to Parcel A be quieted in it. Two affidavits accompanied this motion. The first affidavit is by an attorney, and appears to concern Parcel B of the land, since it refers to the 1918 tax deed to the Sun Land Company. The second affidavit is by the Assistant Supervisor in Charge of Business Affairs for the defendant-appellee, and states that the property is unimproved except for a “dilapidated shack”.
After hearing, defendant-appellee’s motion was granted, and a summary final decree entered, quieting the movant’s title in Parcel A and declaring the 1918 tax deed to the Sun Land Company, which was alleged in the complaint to have conveyed Parcel B, null and void. The final decree did not refer to the 1916 deed to the Security Land Company, and made no finding as to whether the property, title to which was quieted in the Board of Public Instruction, was improved or unimproved, but concluded that the equities were with the said Board, and that it was not estopped to claim title.
Upon this state of the record, the conclusion that there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact” unde.r 31 F.S.A. Equity Rule 40(c) could not have been validly reached, and it is therefore too early to dispose of the other questions raised on this appeal. The complaint clearly alleged that the property had been improved, and this was categorically denied in the answer. 'Not only must the pleadings be considered by the court under Rule 40(c) upon a motion for summary final decree, but in this case, the complaint having been verified, it should have been accorded equal dignity with the affidavits supporting the motion, and could have been treated as a counter-affidavit. The affidavit supporting the motion for summary decree on this issue was qualified, but a serious question still remained. That whether or not the property was improved is “material” cannot be doubted, in the light of Daniell v. Sherill, Fla., 48 So. 2d 736, 23 A.L.R.2d 1410. And see also our decision in Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Bass, Fla., 67 So. 2d 433. The record, moreover, should be clarified regarding the particular parcel of land as to which title is in controversy between the parties to this appeal, and as to the designation of the tax deed affecting this parcel.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the cases hereinabove cited.
ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and DREW, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972)…that a plaintiff’s verified complaint must be accorded equal dignity with affidavits accompanying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment and must be treated as a counter-affidavit. Booth v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Fla., 1953, 67 So. 2d 690. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment cannot be upheld on the theory that there was no justiciable issue of fact in the record. Appellant contends that the statute, if applicable to the facts before the Court, is unconstitutional because it infrin…
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Holcomb v. Dep't OF Corr., 609 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…motion for summary judgment, the allegations in a plaintiffs sworn complaint must be taken as true and accorded the same dignity as the moving party’s affidavit. See Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla.1972); Booth v. Board of Public Instruction, 67 So. 2d 690 (Fla.1953). In essence the appellant is arguing that his case was in the same procedural posture as a motion for summary judgment in a civil case. In a sense the appellant is correct. In order for a court to issue a writ of mandamus, a petitioner “…
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HAM v. Heintzeliman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)…nt. The certificate of title should have been treated as a counter-affidavit and thereby accorded equal dignity with the affidavit supporting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Booth v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Fla.1953, 67 So. 2d 690. It might be well to observe that defendant’s reference to the existence of a “paper issue” is not applicable. See Page v. Staley, supra. Compare with Edwards v. Trulis, Fla.App.1968, 212 So. 2d 893. The so called “paper issue” principle would aris…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1950)
- Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund v. Bass, 67 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1953)