WEISS
v.
KAMEN ET AL.
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In this Florida Supreme Court case, the court addressed whether a guest statute negligence complaint adequately stated a cause of action. The court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's third amended complaint, holding that the allegations of gross negligence in operating an automobile at excessive speed on a dangerous curve were sufficient to survive demurrer.
The complaint stated a sufficient cause of action. Although the court acknowledged the rhetorical inelegance of the complaint, it held that measured by the applicable legal standard, the allegations of gross negligence constituted a proper statement of a cause of action.
“we think the complaint stated a cause of action”
The court's holding that the third amended complaint was sufficient to survive demurrer despite its inelegant drafting.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant operated an automobile at speeds exceeding 80 miles per hour at nighttime on a road with dangerous curves marked by warning signs direct…
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TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice.
Appellant brought this action against appellees under Section 320.59, F.S.A. better known as the guest statute, to recover damages for personal injuries. Pursuant to final judgment on demurrer the third amended complaint was dismissed and the plaintiff appealed.
The only point with which we are concerned is the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action, the pertinent part of which is summarized in question one as follows:
“That the defendant drove and operated an automobile at a speed in excess of 80 miles an hour at nighttime, in violation of the statutes; that the defendant failed and neglected to observe the highway ahead of him, though he knew it contained dangerous curves, and failed to heed the road signs warning him of the dangerous curves ahead of him and commanding him to slow down to 25 miles an hour; that the defendant failed to reduce the speed of 'his car to less than 80 miles per hour while attempting to traverse said dangerous curve, failed and refused to heed the warning and protests of the plaintiff .so he could get out and ride no farther with the defendant; and further alleged that the defendant attempted, while driving at a speed in in excess of 80 miles an hour, to traverse a sharp and dangerous ‘hairpin curve’ where road signs 'had been erected directing traffic to slow down to 25 miles per hour, and in so doing drove his car off the highway, down the embankment, and turned the car over three times, completely demolishing it and permanently injuring the plaintiff; and where the declaration further alleged that the plaintiff was permanently injured and disfigured as a direct and proximate result of the gross negligence of the defendant, did such declaration state a cause of action?”
We do not commend its rhetorical elegance but measured by the rule in Gittleman v. Dixon, 148 Fla. 583, 4 So. 2d 859; Dexter v. Green, Fla., 55 So. 2d 548; Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. 2d 715 and others, we think the complaint stated a cause of action.
In this holding we do not overlook DeWald v. Quarnstrom, Fla., 60 So. 2d 919; McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867; Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So. 2d 870; and other cases relied on by appellee, but we do not think they rule the case at bar. The judgment is reversed with directions to reinstate the cause and proceed accordingly.
SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ., and PARKS, Associate Justice, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1956)…ast sufficient to charge gross negligence within the limits of our prior decisions. See Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. 2d 715; De Wald v. Quarnstrom, Fla.1952, 60 So. 2d 919; Brown v. Roach, Fla.1954, 67 So. 2d 201; Weiss v. Kamen, Fla.1953, 67 So. 2d 761; Schneider v. Saxon, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 501; Dexter v. Green, Fla.1951, 55 So. 2d 548. Upon careful consideration of the record and briefs we find that the able trial judge-committed error in sustaining the motion to dismiss. The judgment is ther…
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FOY v. Fleming, 168 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…ast sufficient to charge gross negligence within the limits of our prior decisions. See Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. 2d 715; De Wald v. Quarnstrom, Fla.1952, 60 So. 2d 919; Brown v. Roach, Fla.1954, 67 So. 2d 201; Weiss v. Kamen, Fla.1953, 67 So. 2d 761; Schneider v. Saxon, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 501; Dexter v. Green, Fla.1951, 55 So. 2d 548.” (Emphasis supplied.) Our Supreme Court has repeatedly-held that where the line separating simple and gross negligence is indistinct that the wise course to fol…
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Ling v. Edenfield, 211 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1954)…wanton misconduct was the proximate cause of the injury, * * Sec. 320.59, Fla.Stat.1951, F.S.A.- . Other examples of gross negligence will be found in Motes v. Crosby, Fla., 65 So. 2d 478; Brown v. Roach, Fla., 67 So. 2d 201; Weiss v. Ramon, Fla., 67 So. 2d 761; Dexter v. Green, Fla., 55 So. 2d 548; Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, Fla., 38 So. 2d 434; Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So. 2d 565; and Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. 2d 715.…
Authorities Cited
- McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1942)
- Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378 (Fla. 1946)
- Dexter v. Green, 55 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1951)
- Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48 (Fla. 1942)
- De Wald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1952)
- Gittleman v. Dixon, 4 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1941)