METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, PETITIONERS,
v.
ANNIE L. HICKS, A/K/A ANNIE L. PETERSON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ANNIE L. HICKS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ARTIE C. HICKS, JR., A DECEASED MINOR, RESPONDENTS
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Metropolitan Dade County and its liability insurer challenged a trial court's refusal to sever claims brought by a mother both individually and as administratrix of her deceased child's estate in a wrongful death action. The court held that Florida law prohibits joinder of individual and representative capacity claims, even if arising from the same occurrence, because they are not claims "in the same right."
No. Under Florida law, a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff individually cannot be joined with one accruing to the same plaintiff in a representative capacity, even when both arise from the same occurrence, because the respective causes of action are not "in the same right."
[1] A cause of action accruing to a plaintiff individually cannot be joined with one accruing to the plaintiff in a representative capacity, even if arising from the same occ…
[2] A trial court's order denying a motion to sever improper parties is reviewable by a common law writ of certiorari.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The long established rule of law in Florida is that a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff individually cannot be joined with one accruing to the plaintiff in a representative capacity although they rise out of the same occurrence because the respective causes of action are not "in the same right."”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that prevents joinder of individual and representative capacity claims despite a common occurrence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnnie Hicks filed a wrongful death action against Metropolitan Dade County on behalf of her deceased minor child, Artie C. Hicks, Jr. After obtaining …
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PER CURIAM.
By petition for common law writ of certiorari, appellants, defendants in the trial court, seek review of the trial court’s order denying their motion to sever improper party.
Plaintiff, Annie Hicks in her individual capacity as mother of Artie C. Hicks, deceased, filed an action against Metropolitan Dade County under the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act [§ 768.03, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.]. With leave of court, plaintiff Hicks amended her complaint to add as an additional party defendant American Home Assurance Company, Dade County’s liability insurer. Prior to the scheduled trial date, plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add as an additional party plaintiff herself as the administratrix of the estate of Artie C. Hicks, Jr., a deceased minor, and to seek damages in her capacity as administratrix pursuant to the Survival and Wrongful Death Statutes [§§ 46.021, 768.02, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.]. This motion to amend was granted and defendants responded with a motion to sever and/or drop the administratrix of the estate of Artie C. Hicks as an improper party plaintiff to the subject action. After hearing, the trial judge entered the following:
“THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard before me upon Defendants’ Motion to Sever and/or Drop and Motion to Dismiss, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and having considered same, it is
“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
“1. That Defendants Motion to Sever and/or Drop ANNIE L. HICKS as Ad-ministratrix of the Estate of Artie Hicks, Jr., is hereby denied.
“2. That Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claim of ANNIE L. HICKS as Administratrix of the Estate of Artie C. Hicks, Jr. on the grounds that the Statute of Limitations has expired is hereby denied.
“DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Dade County, Florida, this 2 day of April, 1975.”
The long established rule of law in Florida is that a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff individually cannot be joined with one accruing to the plaintiff in a representative capacity although they rise out of the same occurrence because the respective causes of action are not “in the same right.” Pensacola Electric Company v. Soderlind, 60 Fla. 164, 53 So. 722 (1910); Latimer v. Sears Roebuck and Company, 285 F. 2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960).
Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted; that portion of the trial judge’s April 2, 1975 order denying defendants’ motion to sever and/or drop Annie L. Hicks as administratrix of the estate of Artie Hicks, Jr. hereby is quashed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to sever the claim of Annie L. Hicks as administratrix of the estate of Artie Hicks, Jr. It is so ordered.
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The Dep't OF Ins. OF the State OF Fla. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 570 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…laintiff in different capacities must be brought separately regardless of whether or not the causes of action arise “out of the same occurrence because the respective causes of action are not ‘in the same right.’ ” Metropolitan Dade County v. Hicks, 323 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (citing Pensacola Elec. Co. v. Soderlind, 60 Fla. 164, 53 So. 722 (1910) and Latimer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 285 F. 2d 152 (5th Cir.1960)). Upon a review of the amended complaint filed in the instant case, we find that the…
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Cnty. OF Sarasota v. Leolus L. Wall, 403 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…for damages against petitioner and other defendants, alleging the wrongful death of his wife and bodily injury and property damage to himself. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, one ground being that under Metropolitan Dade County v. Hicks, 323 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff individually cannot be joined with one accruing to a plaintiff in a representative capacity although they arise out of the same occurrence because the respective causes of action are not…
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Umberto Pages v. Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…ction brought in different representative capacities into a single lawsuit. Department of Ins. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 570 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); County of Sarasota v. Wall, 403 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Metropolitan Dade County v. Hicks, 323 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). As the third district explained in Department of Insurance: Rule 1.110(g), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (1989) states in pertinent part: “A pleader may set up in the same action as many claims or causes of action or defenses…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Latimer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960)
- The Pensacola Elec. Co. v. Gus A. Soderlind, 60 Fla. 164 (Fla. 1910)