JAMES BALDI, APPELLANT,
v.
MILAGROS O. BALDI, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's provision for child support extending beyond age 18, holding that the 1973 emancipation statute limits such support absent a showing of dependency. The court affirmed the alimony award and attorney's fees, finding no error in those provisions.
The court held that the trial court erred in providing child support beyond age 18 years because the record did not reflect that the children were dependent beyond that age, and such support may only be ordered for dependent persons under the statute. The court affirmed the permanent alimony award and attorney's fees, finding no error in those provisions.
[1] Child support payments and the right to occupy the marital home cannot extend beyond a child's 18th birthday unless the child is determined to be dependent beyond that ag…
[2] A court may require support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18, but this determination must be made by the court and is not automatic.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we hold that the trial court erred in providing child support beyond the age of 18 years, by way of money payments and right of occupancy of the home, because § 743.07(1), Fla.Stat., effective July 1, 1973, removed the disabilities of nonage for persons 18 years of age or older”
Establishes the core holding that child support cannot extend beyond age 18 under the emancipation statute absent dependency
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames and Milagros Baldi divorced and had two minor children. The trial court ordered the husband to pay monthly child support until each child reache…
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NATHAN, Judge.
James Baldi appeals from provisions of a final judgment dissolving his marriage to Milagros Baldi.
The parties have two minor children. In the final judgment, the trial judge granted to the wife child support payable monthly until each child reaches age 21, and gave the wife and the two children the right to occupy the marital home until each child reaches age 21. The judgment further provides that when the oldest child reaches 21, the support for the younger child shall increase to $350 per month until he reaches 21, and that the wife shall receive permanent alimony of $250 a month not to be reduced by any income that she might receive.
The husband contends that it was error to provide for child support beyond the age of 18 years, due to the emancipation act adopted by the legislature in 1973, and that it was error to award alimony which cannot be modified. In addition, he contends that although the amount of attorneys fees awarded to the wife’s attorneys is not objectionable, a portion of the payment thereof should be paid by the wife.
Turning to that portion of the judgment for child support, we hold that the trial court erred in providing child support beyond the age of 18 years, by way of money payments and right of occupancy of the home, because § 743.07(1), Fla.Stat., effective July 1, 1973, removed the disabilities of nonage for persons 18 years of age or older and provided that they shall enjoy and suffer the rights, privileges and obligations of all persons 21 years of age or older. Todd v. Todd, Fla.App.1975, 311 So. 2d 769. We note, however, § 743.07(2), Fla.Stat., which provides that, “This act shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years. . . .” The term “dependent” is defined in White v. White, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 619, 623, and in Finn v. Finn, Fla.1975, 312 So. 2d 726. The record in this case does not reflect, nor did the trial judge find, that there is any reason for these two children to be dependent beyond the age of 18 years. Therefore, the question of support as dependent children beyond 18 years of age should be determined by the court, if requested, at the time of the attainment of majority of each child.
Relative to that portion of the final judgment granting permanent alimony not to be reduced by any income the wife would earn, we find no error. We interpret that language of the judgment to reflect the intent of the trial judge. There is nothing in this language which precludes the husband from moving for modification at a later date. Neither do we find error in the award of attorneys fees to be paid to the wife’s attorneys by the husband. Accordingly, child support provisions of the judgment shall now be modified consistent with this opinion, and the court, if it deems it advisable, may take further testimony for such purpose.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
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CYR v. CYR, 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…isdiction to modify the amount or terms of support payments for children. Whether a child is a dependent beyond the age of 18 years should be determined by the court, if requested, at the time of attainment of majority by each child. Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So. 2d 592 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). See also Section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (1975). We have examined appellant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the quoted language is hereby elided and, as amended, the final judgment is affi…
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Dorothea Margaret Delehant v. Delehant, 442 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…marital home here was error. There just is no legal justification or allowable special purpose to be served here by such award. See Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980); Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); and Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. HERSEY, J., concurs. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.…
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Sprunger v. Sprunger, 534 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…be made in' a dissolution hearing. See Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1975); Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Cyr v. Cyr, 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Dissolution proceedings provide a logical forum for the resolution of support and dependency issues involving the children of the parties. See section 61.13, Florida Statutes. John also contends that Jane does not have standing…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975)
- Houston R. White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Todd v. Todd, 311 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)