BERNARD WOODS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Affirmed conviction of robbery; juvenile jurisdiction is divested when a child is indicted for a life felony, even if the child was in juvenile custody for more than 14 days prior to indictment.
Indictment of a child for a life felony divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction and permits trial as an adult, notwithstanding prior custody under juvenile law.
[1] Indictment of a child for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction and permits prosecution as an adult, notwithstand…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWoods was in juvenile custody under Florida law for more than 14 days before being indicted for robbery, a life felony.…
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SMITH, Judge.
Appealing from his conviction of robbery, Woods asserts among other points that it was error for the circuit court to have tried him upon a robbery indictment as an adult because he had been in custody as a juvenile under ch. 39, F.S.1973, for more than 14 days prior to the indictment. Juvenile jurisdiction having not otherwise been waived or divested, appellant urges that § 39.02(5) (c), F.S.1973, requires that he be dealt with as a juvenile notwithstanding the subsequent indictment for a life felony. This point appears not to have been previously decided.
Section 39.02(5) specifies the occasions and procedures for waiver or divesting of juvenile jurisdiction over a child. One of those occasions is the indictment of the child for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. While subsection (c) provides with certain exceptions that no adjudicatory hearing be held until 14 days after a child has been taken into juvenile custody for such an offense, and that the court may then proceed as otherwise required by law, the statute evidences no purpose to disable a grand jury thereafter to indict the child, thereby divesting the court of juvenile jurisdiction.
We have considered appellant’s other points. There was no reversible error. Affirmed.
BOYER, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
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State v. N. B., 360 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…The statute is clear that when such an event occurs, the juvenile division is divested of jurisdiction “and the child shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult.” Cf. A.D.T. v. State, 318 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Woods v. State, 323 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). If, however, the child is not indicted for a capital or life felony, the juvenile division shall exercise jurisdiction over the child until he has been appropriately certified to the adult division. E.H.N. v. Willis, 350 So. 2d…