MAULE INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
CENTRAL RIGGING & CONTRACTING CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1975-12-02
No. 74-1460
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and NATHAN, JJ.
323 So. 2d 631 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Maulé Industries appealed a summary judgment dismissing its third-party indemnity claim against Central Rigging. The court reversed, holding that an indemnity agreement clause sufficiently and unambiguously provided for indemnification of the owner (Maulé) for claims arising from the subcontractor's negligence, meeting Florida's requirement of clear and unequivocal language.


Holding

The indemnity agreement clause is clear and unequivocal and therefore enforceable. The clause specifically provides that Maulé (the owner) is to be indemnified for claims arising from the contract, including acts or omissions of the subcontractor, and Maulé paid an additional premium satisfying statutory requirements. When an indemnity agreement is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations—one providing indemnity and one denying it—the interpretation providing liability must be applied.


Headnotes

[1] An indemnity agreement must specifically and unequivocally state the intent to indemnify the indemnitee for their own negligence under Florida law.

[2] An indemnity clause is not ambiguous if it clearly and unequivocally provides for indemnification of the owner.

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Key Quotes

“Under the law of Florida, intent to indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence must be specifically set out in the indemnity contract in clear and unequivocal terms.”

States the governing legal standard for enforceability of indemnity agreements in Florida

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Facts & Procedural History

Hessler, an employee of Central Rigging (subcontractor), sued Maulé Industries (project owner) for personal injuries allegedly caused by Maulé's negli…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Maulé Industries, Inc., defendant and third-party plaintiff in the trial court, appeals from an adverse final judgment on its third party complaint against Central Rigging & Contracting Corporation, third- party defendant, seeking indemnity in compensating one Hessler, a worker in the employ of Central Rigging, allegedly injured as a result of the negligence of Maulé.

Hessler brought suit for personal injuries against Maulé, the construction project owner, alleging negligence on the part of Maulé. Maule’s third party complaint against Central Rigging is predicated upon an indemnity agreement entered into by McDonald Engineering Company, the general contractor, and Central Rigging, a sub-contractor. Maulé claims to be a third party beneficiary of such agreement. The pertinent portion of the agreement is:

“The policy shall provide for Protective Liability with respect to operations of Sub-subcontractors and shall include Contractual Liability coverage for the following Indemnity Agreement, which Indemnity Agreement is hereby made a part of this contract:
‘The Subcontractor hereby agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the General Contractor and Owner from all suits, actions, legal proceedings, claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees (herein called claims) and from all expense in defending claims, including without limitation court costs, attorneys’ fees, the amounts of any judgments recovered, and any other expenses resulting from claims for bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom sustained by any person and/or resulting from injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof, caused by, arising from, incident to, connected with or growing out of the performance of this contract, including without limitation, the act or omission of the Sub-contractor, his agents, servants or employees and/or by any Sub-subcontractor, his agents, servants or employees and/or by the General Contractor, his agent, servants or employees, and/or by the Owner, his agents, servants or employees.’ ”

The trial court determined that the indemnity agreement was unenforceable because it was ambiguous and unclear. Summary judgment was entered in favor of third party defendant, Central Rigging, and this appeal ensued. The question now before us for consideration is whether or not the clause is ambiguous and unclear. Under the law of Florida, intent to indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence must be specifically set out in the indemnity contract in clear and unequivocal terms. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Fla.App.1967, 196 So. 2d 456; University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, Fla.1973, 272 So. 2d 507; Ivey Plants, Inc. v. PMC Corporation, Fla.App.1973, 282 So. 2d 205.

We note that it clearly appears from the record that Maulé paid an additional premium for the coverage provided in the indemnity agreement, thus meeting the requirement of § 725.06(2), Fla.Stat. We further note that the indemnity clause does specifically provide in clear and unequivocal terms that Maulé, the owner, is to be indemnified. We have studied the clause using both interpretations of the “and/or” language as follows:

The indemnity clause purports to indemnify Maulé

“for claims . . . arising from . this contract . . . including without limitation, the act or omission of Central . . . and McDonald . and Maulé,”

“for claims . . . arising from . this contract . . . including without limitation, the act or omission of Central ... or McDonald . . . or Maulé.”

When an indemnity agreement is reasonably susceptible of two equally fair interpretations, one which will provide indemnity and one which will deny it, the interpretation which provides liability must be ap plied. Da Costa v. General Guaranty Insurance Company of Florida, Fla.1969, 226 So. 2d 104; Lake v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 5th Cir. 1970, 430 F. 2d 1251.

For the reasons stated and on the authorities cited, the summary final judgment herein appealed is reversed.

Reversed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Fla. Aviation Fueling Co., Inc., 578 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …3d DCA 1978); see also Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 810, 813-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Logozzo v. Kent Ins. Co., 464 So. 2d 605, 606-07 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 323 So. 2d 631, 632-33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (indemnity agreement should be read, where possible, in favor of providing indemnity). See generally J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Zack Co., 232 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 764 (Fla.1970). We theref…
  • Kressley-Davis, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 340 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …udge was eminently correct in finding as a matter of law and fact that Winn-Dixie was entitled to contractual indemnification from Kressley-Davis under the terms of the indemnity agreement. See Maule Industries, Inc. v. Central Rigging & Con. Corp., 323 So. 2d 631 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). Affirmed.…
  • AIR Agency, Inc. v. British Airways, 370 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …g that the evidence did not show a contract providing for indemnity of an active tort-feasor. Cf. University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973), and Maulé Industries, Inc. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corporation, 323 So. 2d 631 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). It is clear from the evidence that Air Agency, Inc., as the landlord, was an active tort-feasor in its failure to maintain the area of common usage. See the principles of law in Florida Power Corporation v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687…

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