PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL DOYON D/B/A CUSTOM SPEED AND SPORT, APPELLEE
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Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Company appeals a trial court judgment and attorneys' fees award in favor of its insured, Paul Doyon, who filed suit after being denied coverage under a fire and extended coverage policy. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding the appellant failed to demonstrate reversible error on appeal.
The trial court did not err in entering judgment for the insured or in awarding attorneys' fees. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and the attorneys' fees award because the appellant failed to meet its burden of demonstrating reversible error clearly, definitely, and fully.
[1] A trial court's judgment and order come to an appellate court with a presumption of correctness.
[2] The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error clearly, definitely, and fully.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's final judgment and order come to this court with a presumption of correctness. A corollary to this presumption is the rule that the burden is on appellant to show the errors relied on by it.”
Establishes the standard of review on appeal and the burden placed on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoyon was insured under a standard fire and extended coverage policy issued by Pennsylvania National Mutual. On October 22, 1972, Doyon sustained a fi…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, defendant below, brings these consolidated-appeals from a final judgment and order of the trial court granting appel-lee’s, plaintiff below, claim for damages and awarding it attorneys’ fees.
Appellee was insured under a standard fire and extended coverage policy issued by appellant. After sustaining a fire loss on October 22, 1972, appellee was unsuccessful in collecting under the policy. On September S, 1973, appellee filed a complaint for damages, attorneys’ fees and costs against appellant. The cause proceeded to trial, nonjury, and resulted in a final judgment dated July 5, 1974, in favor of appellee. On October 1, 1974, the trial court entered an order awarding appellee attorneys’ fees and costs. From the judgment and order, appellant brings this appeal.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering the final judgment because (a) the undisputed evidence established that the insurance policy had been procured through misrepresentation, (b) the undisputed evidence established that appellee failed to cooperate and comply with the policy provisions, and (c) the amount of the final judgment, $11,191.40, was an invalid figure. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in entering its order awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount of $10,200.00.
Appellee contends that the record does not support appellant’s contentions on appeal.
The trial court’s final judgment and order come to this court with a presumption of correctness. A corollary to this presumption is the rule that the burden is on appellant to show the errors relied on by it. This burden can be met only by making reversible error clearly, definitely, and fully to appear. Failure to meet this burden impels the conclusion that there is no error in the record, and the judgment or order appealed must be affirmed. See 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals § 316 and the cases cited therein.
We have considered the record, all points in the briefs and arguments of counsel in the light of the controlling principles of law, and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated. Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited, the final judgment and order appealed are affirmed.
Affirmed.
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All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Scandia, Inc., 353 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…t will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. See, e. g. Krasner v. Krasner, 339 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Ruwitch v. First National Bank, 327 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Doyon, 323 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Dade County v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Belman Hotel Corp. v. Maher, 170 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). In the case sub judice, the trial judge, in light of our mandate issued in All-Star Insurance…
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Hillier v. Purdy, 354 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Madison v. Gerstein, 440 F. 2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971); Quinn R. Barton, Inc. v. Johnson, 143 Fla. 245, 196 So. 489 (1940); Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Doyon, 323 So. 2d 677 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Fernandez v. Arocha, 308 So. 2d 45 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Sections 30.30 and 212.15, Florida Statutes (1975); and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510.…