A. FRED VANN, APPELLANT,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN LITTLE ROCK, A NATIONAL BANKING INSTITUTION, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed the dismissal of First National Bank in Little Rock for improper venue in a suit arising from a repossession action. The court held that a national bank waives its statutory venue privilege when it locates itself in another jurisdiction and commits tortious acts through its agent in that jurisdiction.
The court held that a national bank's motion to dismiss on venue grounds was timely filed and that the bank waived its venue privilege by locating itself in another jurisdiction and committing tortious acts through its agent in that jurisdiction. The bank may be sued in the jurisdiction where the local transaction or activity involving the alleged tortious acts occurred.
[1] A national bank's venue privilege under 12 U.S.C. …
[2] A motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue is timely if filed before the court has ruled on a prior pending motion to dismiss.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law is well established that the venue privilege may be waived.”
Establishes that the statutory venue privilege is not absolute and can be forfeited.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA. Fred Vann owned an automobile that was repossessed by Barnes Auto Recovery Bureau, Inc., an agent of First National Bank in Little Rock. Vann alleg…
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NATHAN Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal by appellant, A. Fred Vann, plaintiff in the trial court, from an order dismissing appellee, First National Bank in Little Rock, as a party defendant on the ground of improper venue.
Vann brought suit against certain individual residents of Dade County, Florida, formerly doing business as Barnes Detective Agency Automobile Recovery Bureau, Inc., a Florida corporation, and First Na tional Bank in Little Rock, alleging certain illegal and tortious acts committed by the bank’s agent, Barnes Auto Recovery Bureau, Inc., in Dade County, against Vann, growing out of a repossession by Barnes Auto Recovery of an automobile owned by Vann.
The bank filed its motion to dismiss, asserting its privilege of venue under 12 U.S.C., § 94.1 Vann contends that the venue privilege was waived because the bank did not raise the issue of privilege in its initial motion to dismiss but rather by a second motion to dismiss filed while the former was pending but had not been argued before the court. We find that the motion to dismiss as to venue was timely made. See Rule 1.140 R.C.P. The law is well established that the venue privilege may be waived. First National Bank of Charlotte, North Carolina v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 10 S.Ct. 37, 33 L.Ed. 282; Michigan National Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591, 83 S.Ct. 914, 9 L.Ed.2d 961. The question of waiver of this privilege has been determined on a case by case basis, Am.Jur., Venue (1st Ed) § 46. The primary purpose of 12 U.S.C., § 94 was to prevent inconvenience and interruption in the conduct of the bank’s business which might result from removal of records to a foreign district for purposes of defending a lawsuit. Northside Iron & Metal Company, Inc. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 5th Cir. 1973, 480 F. 2d 798, 800. Suits against banks were limited to the place where the bank was established 'because this is where the bank was “found” and its records were there.
When a bank “locates” itself in another jurisdiction for the limited transaction of business and commits tortious acts, by and through its agent, such as is alleged in this case, we hold that it has waived its privilege to the extent of being sued on the local transaction or activity involving the alleged tortious acts. Compare Buffum v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 7th Cir. 1951, 192 F. 2d 58.
Reversed.
. “§ 94. Venue of suits.
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases. . . . ”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Exch. Nat'l Bank OF Chicago v. Rotocast Plastics Prods., Inc., 341 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…ority of National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics and Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460, 96 S.Ct. 1632, 48 L.Ed. 92, (1976). I also am of the view that we must recede from our opinion in Vann v. First National Bank in Little Rock, 324 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975), which held that when a bank “locates” itself in another jurisdiction for the limited transaction of business and commits tortious acts, by and through its agent, the bank has waived its privilege to the extent of being sued on t…
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Barnett Bank OF Winter Park v. Alford, 332 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…PER CURIAM. ' Affirmed. See Vann v. First National Bank in Little Rock, Fla.App. (3rd), 324 So. 2d 94, opinion filed December 16, 1975. BOYER, C. J., and McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur.…
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Tampa Assocs., Ltd. v. Miami Elevator Co., 545 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…nt or repetitive motion or pleading. Hence, it was properly preserved below. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b) (“No defense or objection is waived by being joined with other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion ”); Vann v. First Nat’l Bank, 324 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see Beal v. Third Nat’l Bank, 350 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.190(a), (c) (amendment as of right before responsive pleading relates back to original); see also Jonnet v. Dollar Savs. Bank, 530 F. 2d 1123, 1125…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mich. Nat'l Bank v. Robertson et ux., 372 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1963)
- First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141 (U.S. 1889)
- Buffum v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951)
- Northside Iron & Metal Co., Inc. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1973)