ROGER LEWIS DORSEY AND DONALD WAYNE BENNETT, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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SMITH, Judge.
From the circumstantial evidence in this case the jury could properly have found that appellants are guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny. The more troublesome question is whether, on an information charging that appellants with requisite intent broke and entered “a certain building located at 300 W. Tharpe Street, [Tallahassee] . , the property of Bill Peacock,” appellants may be convicted on proof thát the building was located on land leased by Bill Peacock Leasing & Rental, Inc. See Alvarez v. State, 157 Fla. 254, 25 So. 2d 661 (1946). There was testimony, albeit ambiguous, that “the building belongs to Mr. Bill Peacock” and “the property, I understand, is leased.” See generally 17 Fla.Jur. Improvements § 3 (1958). At any rate, since for present purposes ownership is any possession which is rightful as against those alleged to be burglars, we conceive that the sole corporate stockholder and operator of a corporate business is, as against burglars, the owner of the building used only for corporate business. See Johnson v. State, 293 So. 2d 71 (Fla.1974); Harper v. State, 169 So. 2d 512 (Fla.App.2d 1964), 172 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1965).
Affirmed.
BOYER, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Adirim v. State, 350 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…any possession which is rightful as against the burglar. Addison v. State, 95 Fla. 737, 740, 116 So. 629, 630 (Fla.1928); Harper v. State, 169 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla.2d DCA 1964). See also Johnson v. State, 293 So. 2d 71 (Fla.1974); Dorsey v. State, 324 So. 2d 159 (Fla.1st DCA 1975). The purposes of the requirement of an allegation of ownership in a burglary charge are essentially twofold: (1) to prove that the premises allegedly broken into were not the property of the accused, and (2) to identify the offen…
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I. v. Anderson, 356 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…1). The courts have often called this element “ownership” which has been defined as a word of art to mean “any possession which is rightful as against the [*385] burglar,” Addison v. State, 95 Fla. 737, 741, 116 So. 629, 630 (1928); Dorsey v. State, 324 So. 2d 159, 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and is satisfied by “proof of special or temporary ownership, possession or control.” Dees v. State, 99 Fla. 1144, 128 So. 485 (1930). The name of the “owner” of the burglarized structure or conveyance as thus defined must…1 / 2
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O'Bryan v. State, 359 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…directions to discharge the appellant. REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions. CROSS and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur. . In the Interest of M. E., 357 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Anderson v. State, 356 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Dorsey v. State, 324 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Alvaro Alvarez v. State, 157 Fla. 254 (Fla. 1946)
- United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. ADA A. Tressler, 157 Fla. 254 (Fla. 1946)
- Harper v. State, 169 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Johnson v. State, 293 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1974)
- Harper v. State, 172 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1965)